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The Development of Religious Liberty in Chile, 
1973-2000 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The principle of religious liberty,” scholar James E. Wood, Jr., 
observed, “may well lay claim to being the foundation of all civil lib-
erties and a democratic state.”1 In addition to “legitimat[ing] an in-
determinate plurality of religions,”2 freedom of religion affirms and 
espouses “the sanctity or intrinsic worth ascribed to the human per-
son,”3 a principle that forms “the basis of all human freedom[s]”4 
necessary for the establishment and preservation of an open and de-
mocratic society.5 According to religious freedom’s proponents, it is 
precisely this “final grounding in the nature and sacredness of the 
human person”6 that makes religious freedom “the condition and 
guardian of all true freedom.”7 
Given that freedom of religion is widely considered a basic hu-
man right or civil liberty—if not “the cornerstone of all other civil 
liberties and all human rights”8—it remains both puzzling and alarm-
ing that Western society, supposedly the world’s most active cham-
pion of democracy and human rights, has developed the “habit of 
ignoring religious persecution”9 and religious human rights in gen-
 
 1. James E. Wood, Jr., The Relationship of Religious Liberty to Civil Liberty and a De-
mocratic State, 1998 BYU L. REV. 479, 479. 
 2. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN 
POLITICS AND THE DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 153 (1995). 
 3. Wood, supra note 1, at 488. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 488 (quoting Henry David Thoreau, Essay on Civil Disobedience, in 4 THE 
WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 356, 387 (1906) (“There will never be a really free 
and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and inde-
pendent power, from which its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accord-
ingly.”)). 
 6. Id. at 489. 
 7. Id. at 490 (quoting Statement on Religious Liberty, in MINUTES AND REPORTS, 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES 15 (1949)). 
 8. Id. at 489. 
 9. Paul Marshall, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Freedom, and International Affairs, Ad-
dress at the Hillsdale College Center for Constructive Alternatives Seminar (Fall 1998), in 
IMPRIMIS, Mar. 1999, at 1, 1. 
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eral.10 Recently, Paul Marshall, a senior fellow at Freedom House’s 
Center for Religious Freedom in Washington, D.C., related the fol-
lowing account illustrating the extent of the prevailing neglect of re-
ligious freedom matters: 
At the end of 1997, former New York Times executive editor A.M. 
Rosenthal confessed, “I realized that in decades of reporting, writ-
ing, or assigning stories on human rights, I rarely touched on one 
of the most important. Political human rights, legal, civil, and press 
rights, emphatically often; but the right to worship where and how 
God or conscience leads, almost never.”11 
Tragically, Marshall concluded, this type of inattentiveness to, if 
not disregard for, religious freedom and religious human rights “is 
all too common in the West.”12 
The neglect of religious persecution and human rights men-
tioned by Marshall forms a prevalent theme in scholars’ examination 
of human rights developments in Chile since 1973. Numerous works 
painstakingly examine General Augusto Pinochet’s authoritarian re-
gime’s violation of political, legal, civil, and press rights13 or the un-
folding of human rights issues following the re-establishment of de-
mocratic government in 1990.14 Such works, however, treat religious 
 
 10. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Frame-
work, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 
(Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). 
 11. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., CYNTHIA BROWN, CHILE SINCE THE COUP: TEN YEARS OF REPRESSION 
(1983); 1-2 CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, REPORT 
OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E. 
Berryman trans., 1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION]; REGGIO EMILIA, VIOLACIÓN 
POR PARTE DE LA JUNTA MILITAR DE LOS PRINCIPIOS ESTABLECIDOS EN LA DECLARACIÓN 
UNIVERSAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL TERRENO DE LA JUVENTUD (1975); 
COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL INVESTIGADORA DE LOS CRÍMENES DE LA JUNTA MILITAR EN 
CHILE, LOS CRÍMENES FASCISTAS DE LA JUNTA MILITAR CHILENA: INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN 
INTERNACIONAL INVESTIGADORA DE LOS CRÍMENES DE LA JUNTA MILITAR EN CHILE 
(1976); MARY HELEN SPOONER, SOLDIERS IN A NARROW LAND: THE PINOCHET REGIME IN 
CHILE (1994); F. Van Hoof, The Protection of Human Rights and the Impact of Emergency 
Situations under International Law with Special Reference to the Present Situation in Chile, 10 
DROITS DE L’HOMME 213 (1979). 
 14. See, e.g., CYNTHIA BROWN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE “POLITICS OF 
AGREEMENTS”: CHILE DURING PRESIDENT AYLWIN’S FIRST YEAR (1991); COMISIÓN 
CHILENA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, BALANCE DE LA SITUACIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 
DURANTE 1990 (1991); LUIS RONIGER & MARIO SZNAJDER, THE LEGACY OF HUMAN-
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND URUGUAY (1999); 
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liberty concerns superficially at best. Discussions of “religious” issues 
almost exclusively address the Chilean government’s violation of the 
political, legal, and press rights of those religious organizations that 
opposed the government’s authoritarian policies and practices15 or 
theorize about the socio-political role that religious organizations 
might play in the future of Chilean democracy.16 Though such issues 
constitute a legitimate and important area of study, the present trend 
 
ELIN SKAAR, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION: A STUDY OF CHILE AND ARGENTINA (1994). 
 15. See, e.g., MICHAEL FLEET & BRIAN H. SMITH, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND 
DEMOCRACY IN CHILE AND PERU 59-75, 111-58 (1997); ANOTHONY GILL, RENDERING 
UNTO CAESAR: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 121-48 (1998); 
LA IGLESIA Y LA JUNTA MILITAR DE CHILE (DOCUMENTOS) 53-74 (1975) [hereinafter LA 
IGLESIA Y LA JUNTA MILITAR]; JEFFREY KLAIBER, IGLESIA, DICTADURAS Y DEMOCRACÍA EN 
AMÉRICA LATINA 88-100 (1997); BRIAN LOVEMAN, CHILE: THE LEGACY OF HISPANIC 
CAPITALISM 315-317 (2d ed. 1988); PAMELA LOWDEN, MORAL OPPOSITION TO 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN CHILE, 1973-90 (1996); ORLANDO MELLA, RELIGION AND 
POLITICS IN CHILE: AN ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS MODELS 35-44 (1987); BRIAN H. SMITH, 
THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN CHILE: CHALLENGES TO MODERN CATHOLICISM 283-355 
(1982); EUGENIO YAÑEZ, LA IGLESIA CHILENA Y EL GOBIERNO MILITAR: ITINERARIO DE 
UNA DIFÍCIL RELACIÓN (1973-1988) 51-132 (1989); Carolyn Cook Dipboye, The Roman 
Catholic Church and the Political Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America, 1968-1980, in 
24 J. CHURCH & STATE 497 (1982); Michael Fleet, The Chilean Church and the Transition to 
Democracy, in ORGANIZED RELIGION IN THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF LATIN 
AMERICA 41, 65-95 (Satya R. Pattnayak ed., 1994); Brian Loveman, Antipolitics in Chile, 
1973-94, in THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS: THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA 268, 274-
276 (Brian Loveman & Thomas M. Davies, Jr. eds., 1997) [hereinafter POLITICS OF 
ANTIPOLITICS]; Martín Poblete, Chile from the Patronato to Pinochet, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND EVANGELIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 220, 
220-34 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1999) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
EVANGELIZATION]; Brian H. Smith, The Catholic Church and Politics in Chile, in CHURCH 
AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 321, 321-43 (Dermot Keogh ed., 1990) [hereinafter Smith, 
Catholic Church]; Brian H. Smith, Chile: Deepening the Allegiance of Working-Class Sectors to 
the Church in the 1970s, in RELIGION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA 156, 
156-86 (Daniel H. Levine ed., 1986) [hereinafter Smith, Chile]; Brian H. Smith, Churches and 
Human Rights in Latin America: Recent Trends on the Subcontinent, in CHURCHES AND 
POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 155, 155-162 (Daniel H. Levine ed., 1980); Hannah Stewart-
Gambino, Redefining the Changes and Politics in Chile, in CONFLICT AND COMPETITION: 
THE LATIN AMERICAN CHURCH IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 21, 21-44 (Edward L. 
Cleary & Hannah Stewart-Gambino eds., 1992); cf. WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, TORTURE AND 
EUCHARIST: THEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE BODY OF CHRIST (1998) (discussing the Pino-
chet government’s oppression of the Catholic Church in the context of torture, ecclesiology, 
and Eucharist). 
 16. See, e.g., VIRGINIA MARIE BOUVIER, ALLIANCE OR COMPLIANCE: IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA (1983); 
FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 159-94; MARÍA ANTONIETA HUERTA & LUIS PACHECO 
PASTENE, LA IGLESIA CHILENA Y LOS CAMBIOS SOCIOPOLÍTICOS 293-343 (1988); Stewart-
Gambino, supra note 15, at 33-41. 
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leaves larger religious freedom questions and interests essentially un-
explored. 
The topic of religious freedom in Chile from 1973 to the present 
warrants serious scholarly attention for several significant reasons. 
For example, as previously discussed, the principle of religious liberty 
arguably “is integrally related to all other civil liberties and to the 
maintenance of a free and democratic state.”17 Accordingly, the evo-
lution of Chilean democracy between 1973 and the present can be 
fully understood only upon considering Chile’s treatment of reli-
gious freedom issues. Similarly, a comprehensive understanding of 
Chilean political, legal, and human rights developments during this 
period depends upon the consideration of all relevant factors, includ-
ing religion and religious liberty.18 Lastly, the topic provides valuable 
case study information regarding the treatment of religious freedom 
issues by the ideologically similar military regimes that emerged in 
South America during the 1960s and 1970s;19 the treatment of reli-
gious freedom issues by governments ruling through emergency 
powers; and the carry-over of civil rights policies and practices from 
authoritarian military regimes to successor forms of government, es-
pecially the “protected democracy.”20 
In light of these potential benefits, this Comment explores the 
evolution of religious liberty in Chile between 1973 and the present. 
To provide an adequate historical background against which to un-
derstand post-1973 developments relating to religious freedom, Part 
II briefly summarizes the evolution of religious liberty in Chile prior 
to 1973. Part III examines and compares the manner in which reli-
gious liberty has evolved under the Pinochet regime and the elected 
governments that have succeeded it, focusing on three particular fac-
tors: the development of Chile’s national juridical framework, the na-
tional government’s perception and treatment of religious groups 
and organizations, and the public’s perception and treatment of reli-
 
 17. Wood, supra note 1, at 488. 
 18. Cf. Marshall, supra note 9, at 5-6 (arguing that “[a]nalyses [of any political order] 
that ignore religion should be inherently suspect”). 
 19. Between the mid-1960s and late 1970s, ideologically similar military regimes 
emerged in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. For a discussion on their views, simi-
larities, and differences, see generally POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS, supra note 15, at 158-364. 
 20. BRIAN LOVEMAN, FOR LA PATRIA: POLITICS AND THE ARMED FORCES IN LATIN 
AMERICA 213 (1999). For a discussion of “protected democracy” in Chile, see infra notes 71-
72, 190 and accompanying text. 
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gious groups and organizations. A close examination of these factors 
reveals three significant characteristics of the post-1973 development 
and status of religious liberty in Chile: (1) the national security poli-
cies and concerns that heavily influenced the evolution of religious 
freedom under the military government did not carry over to the 
post-Pinochet period, (2) throughout the post-Pinochet period, 
both questionable government treatment of smaller religious groups 
and conventional rivalries between different religious groups and be-
liefs have dominated religious liberty developments, and (3) though 
the Pinochet regime added several notable provisions to Chile’s na-
tional juridical framework defining the scope of religious freedom, 
the consolidation of democracy in the post-Pinochet period has 
greatly strengthened the country’s commitment to protecting free-
dom of religion. Part IV offers several observations on the course 
that religious liberty in Chile might follow during the near future, 
focusing on the potential benefits and problems associated with re-
cent Chilean legislation regarding religious freedom, ecumenism, 
and the involvement of religious groups in national politics.  
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CHILE 
PRIOR TO PINOCHET: 1818-1973 
Topics such as freedom of religion cannot be adequately studied 
or understood in a vacuum. Affected by and intermingled with such 
factors as politics, church-state relations, and social values and atti-
tudes, religious freedom can only be truly comprehended by also 
understanding the various factors that determined the context in 
which it has evolved. 
Though a comprehensive examination of all of the historical fac-
tors that affected the development of religious liberty in Chile lies 
beyond the scope of this Comment, this Part provides a concise 
summary of the development of religious liberty and “religious his-
tory” in Chile prior to 1973. In addition to placing post-1973 de-
velopments related to religious liberty in historical context, this 
summary reveals that: (1) the de jure establishment of religious free-
dom as a constitutionally protected right occurred only after more 
than a century of de facto developments and practices favoring reli-
gious freedom and confrontation with the Chilean Catholic Church; 
(2) by 1973, Chile’s juridical regime defining religious liberty guar-
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anteed the basic freedoms of belief and conscience but remained 
largely undeveloped; and (3) by 1973, the “social question”21 had 
become, with varying success, a central element of some religious 
organizations’ beliefs and practices and, in many instances, had 
blurred, if not erased, the line between religious belief and political 
thought. 
A.  The Realization of De Jure and De Facto Religious Freedom: 
1818-1925 
For the first century of Chile’s existence as an independent state, 
the nation’s constitutional regime proscribed religious freedom, 
making Chile “one of the most [religiously] intolerant of the Catho-
lic governments of South America.”22 Supported by various “proc-
lamations, provisional statutes, and organic laws” promulgated dur-
ing the first several decades following independence,23 each of the 
five constitutions that governed Chile between 1818 and 1925 
established Roman Catholicism as the state religion and severely re-
stricted, if not altogether prohibited, the public exercise of non-
Catholic religions.24 De jure religious exclusivity rather than religious 
 
 21. The term “social question” refers to “the continued growth of the urban and indus-
trial proletariat and the intensified struggle between labor and capital” that developed in Chile 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 196. More 
specifically, the social question involved the working class’s fight for such issues as the right to 
unionize/organize, the abolishment of child labor, and the establishment of minimum wages 
and maximum hours of work. See id. “Thus [sic] the social question in Chile, as in the rest of 
the Western world, consisted of political, social, and economic issues derived from the techno-
logical and demographic effects of industrialization during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.” Id. 
 22. J. LLOYD MECHAM, CHURCH AND STATE IN LATIN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF 
POLITICO-ECCLESIASTICAL RELATIONS 201 (Rev. ed. 1966). 
 23. Id. 
 24. As occurred in other Spanish American countries, Chile’s search for political stability 
in the years following the realization of independence from Spain led to the adoption of multi-
ple constitutions. Promulgated in 1818, 1822, 1823, 1828, and 1833, respectively, these con-
stitutions differed from each other in various ways. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 
117-25 (detailing the general ideological and structural differences between Chile’s first five 
constitutions). All, however, treated the “religious question” similarly by maintaining the su-
premacy of Catholicism and severely limiting, if not totally proscribing, freedom of religion. 
Consider the provisions described below. 
  (1) The Constitution of 1818 declared that “[t]he Roman Catholic Apostolic relig-
ion is the sole and exclusive faith of the State of Chile. Its protection, conservation, purity, and 
inviolability will be one of the duties of the chiefs of society who will never permit another 
public cult or doctrine contrary to that of Jesus Christ.” MECHAM, supra note 22, at 202 
(quoting 1 LEYES PROMULGADAS EN CHILE DESDE 1810 HASTA EL 10 DE JUNIO DE 1913, at 
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53 (Ricardo Anguita ed., 1913) [hereinafter LEYES PROMULGADAS]). Also, the Constitution 
stipulated that only Chilean citizens who lived in the country could be appointed to ecclesiasti-
cal positions, and acknowledged the government’s authority to appoint ecclesiastical officials 
and control Church administrative matters. See id. (citing 1 LEYES PROMULGADAS, supra, at 
55). 
  Known as the patronato real (“royal patronage”), MARK A. BURKHOLDER & 
LYMAN L. JOHNSON, COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA 84 (2d ed. 1994), the authority granted to 
the Chilean government over the Church’s affairs originated in the early sixteenth century, 
when the Pope bestowed upon the Spanish monarchy “the right to name religious functionar-
ies in the New World.” LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 45. In exchange for this right, the Crown 
“assumed responsibility to promote the conversion of the Amerindians and to support the co-
lonial Church.” BURKHOLDER & JOHNSON, supra, at 84. With respect to the latter, the mon-
archy exercised control over (1) the “tithe income, [a] tax levied on agricultural production 
and livestock[] [that] sustain[ed] the ecclesiastical hierarchy, its physical facilities, and its activi-
ties”; (2) the “founding of churches, convents, and hospitals,” id.; (3) the payment of clerics; 
and (4) the ability of ecclesiastics to travel both within the colonies and between Spain and the 
colonies. See id. 
  Though Chile and the other Spanish American countries claimed the right of the 
patronato as an element of national sovereignty in conjunction with their realization of inde-
pendence from Spain in the early- to mid-1820s, their individual claims met with mixed suc-
cess for two principal reasons. First, for several decades following Spanish American independ-
ence, “papal policy tended to follow that of Spain . . . by withholding recognition” of the new 
countries. HAROLD EUGENE DAVIS ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 76 (1977). Second, “difficult substantive issues” such as the patronato re-
quired “the negotiation of a treaty (concordat) recognizing Roman Catholicism as the national 
religion and regulating Church-state relations. These concordats came much later [than dip-
lomatic recognition usually did], generally after [1850], if at all.” Id. at 77. Despite receiving 
official recognition from the Vatican in 1840, Chile never negotiated a concordat that pro-
vided it control over the patronato. See id. at 76, 77 n.14. Consequently, Chile’s “pretense to 
national patronage . . . was without foundation or sanction,” making any Chilean exercise of 
control over the patronato an arrangement “only of convenience” on the part of the Church. 
MECHAM, supra note 22, at 212. For more information on the history of the patronato real as 
well as Chile’s relations with the Vatican and endeavors to exercise the patronato, see generally 
MECHAM, supra note 22, at 61-87, 202-05. 
  (2) The Constitution of 1822 added to the religious provisions of the Constitution 
of 1818 the requirement that “[t]he inhabitants of the territory shall pay it (Roman Catholic 
Church) the greatest respect and veneration, whatever might be their private opinions.” 
MECHAM, supra note 22, at 205 (quoting 1 LEYES PROMULGADAS, supra, at 102-13). More-
over, the following article of the 1822 constitution classified “[a]ll violations of the preceding 
article” as “a crime against the fundamental laws of the land.” Id. (quoting 1 LEYES 
PROMULGADAS, supra, at 113). 
  (3) The Constitution of 1823 established Catholicism as the state religion, pro-
scribed the public and private exercise of other religious faiths, and granted the president the 
right of the patronato. See id. In addition, it required that each national senator “undertake an 
investigation tour of the provinces to examine the status of religious and moral conditions.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
  (4) Like its predecessors, the Constitution of 1828 granted the executive the au-
thority to negotiate concordats with the Vatican while limiting its ability to appoint Church 
officials by requiring that candidates for bishop be presented to the lower house of the Na-
tional Congress. See id. at 206. Unlike the three previous constitutions, however, the Constitu-
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freedom thus formed Chile’s constitutional standard prior to 1925. 
Despite these constitutional restrictions, three interrelated, non-
juridical factors worked to render freedom of religion “a de facto re-
ality”25 by the end of the nineteenth century. First, the arrival and 
growth of non-Catholic religious groups throughout the nineteenth 
century established the foundations of religious pluralism.26 Though 
Chile’s non-Catholic population remained small, its presence none-




tion of 1828 permitted the private exercise of non-Catholic religions and protected individuals 
from persecution based on their private beliefs. See id. Though these latest provisions sug-
gested a somewhat more tolerant attitude toward religious liberty, a significant “retrogressive 
step” occurred later in 1828 with the enactment of a law that criminalized and defined as blas-
phemy “all published attacks on the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church.” Id. 
  The Constitution of 1833 made “[n]o attempt . . . to reduce the severity of Chile’s 
religious policy.” Id. Accordingly, the Constitution (1) established Catholicism as the state 
religion and prohibited the public exercise of all other faiths; (2) required the president, in tak-
ing the oath of office, to “swear to observe and protect the Catholic religion,” id.; (3) empow-
ered the president to exercise the patronato with the limitation that certain positions be ratified 
by the Senate; (4) permitted the president to both maintain diplomatic relations and conclude 
concordats with the Vatican; and (5) created the Council of State, “of which a Church digni-
tary must be a member, . . . to have cognizance over all matters of ecclesiastical patronage that 
might be subject to litigation.” Id. 
  The five constitutions that governed Chile between 1818 and 1925 thus established 
de jure religious exclusivity that identified Catholicism as the state religion and either prohib-
ited or severely restricted religious liberty. 
 25. SMITH, supra note 15, at 71 (emphasis added). 
 26. Prior to 1925, the growth of Chile’s non-Catholic community stemmed primarily 
from the arrival of non-Catholic immigrants and workers and the activities of Protestant mis-
sionaries. The first Protestant groups arrived in Chile in 1819, when the British and Foreign 
Bible Society sent representatives to Santiago, see IGNACIO VERGARA, EL PROTESTANTISMO 
EN CHILE 9-13 (1962), and the Anglican Church received special permission to construct two 
parishes in the port city of Valparaíso. See Poblete, supra note 15, at 220-22. In the early 
1820s, the British and Foreign Bible Society established several schools in Santiago and Val-
paraíso and was granted confiscated Catholic convents to serve as school facilities. See LUIS 
GALDAMES, A HISTORY OF CHILE 216 (Isaac J. Cox ed. & trans., 1964); MECHAM, supra 
note 22, at 206. Between 1840 and 1870, the arrival of German colonists, British engineers 
and mine workers, and missionaries of various nationalities introduced the Lutheran and Pres-
byterian churches to Chile. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 37; SMITH, supra note 15, 
at 71; VERGARA, supra, at 31-35, 36-43. Finally, Chile’s non-Catholic community increased 
significantly between 1870 and 1925 with the arrival of additional Protestant denominations 
(e.g., Methodism, the Christian Alliance and Mission, Seventh Day Adventism, Baptist Protes-
tantism, the Salvation Army), other non-Catholic Christian churches (e.g., Greek Orthodoxy 
and Catholicism of the Eastern Rite), and both Ashkenazi and Sephardic Judaism. See 
VERGARA, supra, at 50-63, 73-75, 79-82, 89-95, 99-100; Gunter Böhm, Cuatro siglos de 
Presencia Judía en Chile, REVISTA CHILENA DE HUMANIDADES, 1983 No. 4, at 93, 102-03. 
THU-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:36 PM 
1185] Religious Liberty in Chile 
 1193 
Second, the fact that “[t]he constitutional exclusion of the public 
exercise of other [religions] was never completely enforced” 27 forti-
fied religious pluralism and instituted a de facto basis for religious 
freedom. From the early-nineteenth century, religious services held 
by non-Catholic groups occurred “regularly and openly,”28 without 
government interference, because public officials interpreted the 
constitutional term “public exercise” “as not prohibiting religious 
worship of non-Catholics inside buildings.”29 
Third, and perhaps most important, Chilean politicians’ imple-
mentation of political liberalism and anticlericalism30 resulted in the 
enactment of legislation that granted non-Catholics specific legal 
rights,31 formally reinterpreted the constitutional language regarding 
freedom of religion to provide legal protection and permission to 
worship to all religious denominations,32 and severely curbed the 
Catholic Church’s traditional socio-political authority and func-
tions.33 Though efforts to enact constitutional amendments guaran-
 
 27. MECHAM, supra note 22, at 207. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. The term “anticlericalism” refers to the liberal view that “the Catholic [Church] 
tradition was one of sterility and oppression,” which mandated that the Church’s authority 
should be restricted “to its strictly religious sphere because it was . . . an obstacle to modern 
progress.” Id. at 417. Anticlericalism, therefore, “was not antireligious, but merely sought to 
deprive the Church of those means and privileges which enabled it to exercise political power.” 
Id. 
 31. See id. at 207-08 (describing laws allowing non-Catholics to marry according to 
their own religious rites, conduct religious services in privately-owned facilities, and establish 
and support private religious schools). 
 32. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 37; Poblete, supra note 15, at 222. Known 
as the “Interpretive Law” (“Ley Interpretiva”), the government’s new construction of Article 
Five of the Constitution of 1833 stated: 
Article 1. It is declared that by Article 5 of the Constitution[,] those who do not 
profess the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion are permitted to practice their cult in-
side private buildings. 
Article 2. Dissidents are permitted to establish and support private schools for the 
instruction of their children in the doctrine of their religion. 
MECHAM, supra note 22, at 207-08 n.26 (quoting CONSTITUCIÓN Y LEYES POLÍTICAS DE LA 
REPÚBLICA DE CHILE VIGENTE EN 1881, at 48 (1881)). 
 33. See GALDAMES, supra note 26, at 217 (noting that the founding of Santiago’s first 
general cemetery clashed with the Church’s policy of interring the dead either inside or near to 
a church); MECHAM, supra note 22, at 204, 211-14 (describing the government’s actions to 
suppress religious orders and confiscate their property; abolish the state-collected tithe; place 
the clergy on regular salaries paid by the government, thereby discontinuing the additional 
wages formerly paid by the dioceses; donate dispossessed convents to Protestant schools; make 
civil laws compulsory; place all civil records under state control; remove cemeteries from exclu-
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teeing religious liberty and achieve the separation of church and state 
failed,34 the laws that were enacted successfully provided specific as-
pects of religious liberty with limited de jure protection and ad-
vanced de facto religious freedom in general by weakening the tradi-
tional privileges, authority, and activities of the Catholic Church.35 
With the establishment of de facto religious liberty by the turn of 
the century, two important developments marked the evolution of 
religious freedom by 1925. First, religion ceased to be a socially and 
politically divisive matter due to increasing religious tolerance and 
indifference.36 Second, building upon both the nineteenth century’s 
 
sive Church control; and eliminate the ecclesiastical fuero, or the right of clergymen to be tried 
and punished by an ecclesiastical court rather than the national court system). It should be 
noted that the Church’s defensive response to these developments further undermined its 
socio-political authority. During the late nineteenth century, the Church sought to protect its 
authority and resources from additional anticlerical restraints by strengthening its affiliation 
with the Conservative Party. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 71. Several bishops became official 
party members, numerous priests served as party representatives in the national legislature, 
clergymen became heavily involved in local electoral campaigns, and Church funds occasionally 
were used to support Conservative candidates in elections. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, 
at 37; SMITH, supra note 15, at 71. Not only did these events fail to prevent the erosion of its 
traditional privileges but they also damaged the Church’s moral credibility and generated po-
litically-related divisions between ecclesiastical officials. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 71. 
 34. See MECHAM, supra note 22, at 210, 214-15. 
 35. Though none of the government’s initial (pre-1850) anticlerical acts seriously 
threatened the Church’s privileged standing, see id. at 206 (“The Church emerged [from these 
incidents] practically unscathed in fortune and privilege.”) (citation omitted), the ecclesiastical 
reforms of the late-nineteenth century “seriously weakened the Chilean Church; in a formal 
encounter it had been defeated and humiliated; its prestige was shaken and thereafter it was 
placed on the defensive.” Id. at 215. 
 36. See GALDAMES, supra note 26, at 429. Writing in 1911, the Chilean historian Luis 
Galdames described this phenomenon, affirming that 
[a] marked religious evolution . . . is to be noted throughout the country. It is not 
that the people are leaving the Church; at least three fourths of the national popula-
tion continue to be as sincerely Catholic as during former times. Nor does [the 
Church] experience hostility from those who are not Catholic: the Protestants in the 
republic are almost entirely foreigners, English, North Americans, or Germans, and 
respectful toward all beliefs; the freethinkers do not constitute a group organized 
against the Church; they are simply private persons who feel themselves free from 
the necessity of complying with the precepts of any religion whatsoever. The evolu-
tion noted presents other manifestations—religious tolerance and religious indiffer-
ence. 
  Today it is not a mark of honor in a believer to hate all other faiths except his 
own, or the men who support or embody such faiths. In judging an individual, one 
does not ask what religion he practices or what he believes. It is also obvious that 
most people do not now pay attention to, or practice with the former diligence, 
[various religious customs and rites]. . . . Even the political influence of the clergy 
has diminished. . . . The republic has thus attained religious peace and an absolute 
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de facto and de jure developments and the recent rise of religious tol-
erance and indifference, proponents of political liberalism in 1925 
promulgated a new constitution that recognized, for the first time in 
Chilean history, absolute de jure freedom of religion and separation 
of church and state.37 
Contrary to the exclusionist nature of its predecessors,38 the 
Constitution of 1925 guaranteed the: 
[p]ractice of all beliefs, liberty of conscience and the free exercise of 
all religions not contrary to morality, good usage and public order. 
Therefore, the respective religious bodies ha[d] the right to erect 
and maintain houses for worship and accessory property under the 
conditions of security and hygiene as fixed by the laws and regula-
tions.39 
In accordance with an agreement between the Chilean government 
and the Catholic Church,40 the Constitution also granted religious 
organizations certain rights with respect to property and facilities: 
The churches, creeds and religious institutions of any ritual shall 
have the rights in respect to their property that the laws now in 
force stipulate or recognize; but they will be subject, under the 
guarantees of this Constitution, to the general law in the exercise of 
ownership of their future-acquired property.  
 
 
liberty of worship that is founded in the customs of society and the very soul of the 
people. 
Id. at 429-30. 
 37. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 38. Unlike previous attempts to create a new 
constitutional standard recognizing religious freedom and separation of church and state that 
had failed in part due to opposition from the Catholic Church, the religious liberty-related 
provisions of the Constitution of 1925 received the Church’s active support. See id. In particu-
lar, the Church agreed to support separation of church and state in return for certain conces-
sions from the government: (1) the Church would be granted continued public legal status 
and indemnified for confiscated properties, (2) state claims of authority over the appointment 
of Church officials and administration of internal Church matters would be abolished, (3) pub-
lic schools would continue to provide religious instruction, and (4) there would be no consti-
tutional recognition of atheism. See id. Government officials accepted the Church’s terms and 
ratified the arrangement through a concordat with the Vatican. See id. 
 38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 39. CHILE CONST. of 1925 art. 10, no. 2 (General Secretariat, Organization of Ameri-
can States trans., 1972). 
 40. See supra note 37. 
THU-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:36 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1196 
Churches and accessory property intended for the service of any re-
ligious sect are exempt from taxation.41 
The Constitution of 1925 thus achieved the recognition of a consti-
tutional right to freedom of belief and conscience as well as the free 
exercise of such beliefs while guaranteeing religious groups and or-
ganizations the right to own property and maintain houses of wor-
ship. 
In addition, the Constitution of 1925 included several additional 
guarantees that strengthened an individual or organization’s ability 
to manifest belief and disseminate religious information. For exam-
ple, Article 10 secured the “right of assembly without prior li-
cense,”42 “[t]he right of association without prior license and in con-
formity with the law,”43 and various rights derived from, or affiliated 
with, the freedom of expression.44 Together, these provisions acted 
to fortify their sister proviso guaranteeing the free exercise of religion 
by protecting the ability to meet publicly or privately, form religious 
associations, and share religious beliefs and information.45 
 
 41. CHILE CONST. of 1925 art 10, no. 2. 
 42. Id. no. 4. 
 43. Id. no. 5. 
 44. See id. no. 3. Section Three specifically affirmed the 
[f]reedom to express, without prior censorship, opinions, either orally or in writing, 
through the press, radio, . . . or any other medium, without prejudice to liability for 
offenses and abuses that may be committed in the exercise of this liberty in the 
manner and in the cases as determined by law . . . . 
. . . . 
All streams of opinion shall have the right to utilize, under the conditions of equality 
determined by law, publicity and communications media owned or used by private 
sources. 
Every natural or juridical person . . . shall have the right to organize, found and 
maintain newspapers, magazines, periodicals and radio transmitting stations, under 
the conditions established by law. . . . 
The importation of and trading in books, printed matter and magazines shall be free 
without prejudice to the regulations and taxes that the law may impose. It is forbid-
den to discriminate arbitrarily between newspaper, periodical, magazine and other 
publishing firms, radio broadcasting . . . stations in matters relating to the sale or 
supplying, in any form, of paper, ink, machinery or other work materials, or relating 
to authorizations or permits that may be necessary for such acquisitions within or 
outside the country. 
Id. 
 45. In addition to constitutional guarantees relating to religious freedom, the Constitu-
tion of 1925 contained a transitory provision concerning church-state relations. The provision 
(1) invalidated all laws pertaining to relations between the Church and Chilean government, 
the patronato, and other related topics and (2) obligated the Chilean government to pay the 
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The Constitution of 1925 thus marked the culmination of ap-
proximately eighty-five years of effort to realize de jure freedom of 
religion. By guaranteeing the individual freedoms of belief, associa-
tion, assembly, and expression, the separation of church and state, 
and religious groups’ rights to possess property and buildings of 
worship, the Constitution of 1925 achieved a number of firsts in 
Chilean juridical history. Perhaps more importantly, however, it pro-
vided a solid, though relatively undeveloped, base from which reli-
gious liberty could continue to develop. 
B. Religious Liberty, Religious Pluralism, and the Politicization of 
Religious Doctrine and Practice: 1925-1973 
The period 1925-1973 witnessed a dramatic slowing in the evo-
lution of religious liberty in Chile. Chile’s juridical regime acknowl-
edged the constitutional guarantees of the Constitution of 1925 and 
the liberal reforms of the late-nineteenth century,46 but its scope and 
depth developed only slightly, even though such religiously linked 
issues as education provided fertile ground for occasional religious 
liberty-related conflicts.47 Nevertheless, the existing regime ranked 
Chile as “one of the most liberal nations in matters of religion.”48 
Also, relations between the Chilean government and the Catholic 
Church remained amicable throughout the period, allowing the 
Church’s social prominence and authority to increase considerably.49 
With respect to religious liberty during the Pinochet period, the 
most significant “religious” developments between 1925 and 1973 
involved the growth of religious pluralism and the politicization of 
 
Church 2,500,000 pesos annually for five years for the purpose of easing the Church’s trans-
formation into an independent organization. See id. transitory provision No. 1. 
 46. See MECHAM, supra note 22, at 220-22. 
 47. With respect to religious liberty-related battles associated with education, non-
Catholics and proponents of religious liberty defeated efforts to require the teaching of Catho-
lic doctrine in public elementary schools in the 1940s. See Situación de las iglesias evangélicas 
en Chile, in LA IGLESIA Y LA JUNTA MILITAR, supra note 15, at 111-12. In the early 1970s, 
the Catholic Church and other nonreligious elements of society (including the military) suc-
cessfully countered Chile’s socialist government’s efforts to found “a National Unified School 
system (ENU) requiring all public and private schools to adopt an ideology of ‘socialist 
humanism’ under state supervision.” Smith, Catholic Church, supra note 15, at 326. Based on 
the Church hierarchy’s theological opposition to Marxism, Chile’s bishops argued that the 
ENU failed to provide “sufficient consideration to the ‘religious values which are part of the 
spiritual patrimony of Chile.’” SMITH, supra note 15, at 198. 
 48. MECHAM, supra note 22, at 201. 
 49. See id. at 222. 
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religious belief and practice. Driven by the arrival of Evangelical and 
Pentecostal Protestantism from North America in the 1950s and 
1960s, religious pluralism experienced unprecedented growth in the 
two decades prior to 1973. Both variants of Protestantism, but espe-
cially Pentecostalism, expanded rapidly, and the number of their ad-
herents quickly surpassed those of the historic Protestant churches 
that had been in Chile since the mid- to late-nineteenth century.50 
More importantly, the spread of Evangelical and Pentecostal Protes-
tantism briskly increased the size of Chile’s total Protestant popula-
tion from 1.4% of the national population in 1930 to 6.2% in 1970.51 
Second, beginning in the 1930s, a growing tendency to identify 
the “social question”52 with religious doctrine and practice led to the 
growth of “social Christianity.” Social Christianity maintained that 
an important part of Christian doctrine involved using political 
means to reform societal institutions in a manner that benefited the 
poor and ensured social equality.53 Politically, social Christians gen-
erally believed that their support for “a pluralist welfare-state democ-
racy as the form of government most faithful to the principles of the 
Christian gospels” represented a middle way between “liberal indi-
vidualism and collectivist socialism.”54 The movement’s most ex-
treme variation, known generally as “liberation theology,” drew on 
developmental theory and Marxist precepts to call for the “libera-
tion” of the poor by overthrowing the existing socio-political order  
 
 
 50. See generally WILLIAM R. READ ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN CHURCH GROWTH 101-
09 (1969) (describing the growth of Protestantism in Chile through 1967). 
 51. National census statistics placed the percentage of Protestants in the national popu-
lation at 1.4 % in 1930, 2.3 % in 1940, 4.1 % in 1950, 5.6 % in 1960, and 6.2 % in 1970. See 
EMILIO WILLEMS, FOLLOWERS OF THE NEW FAITH: CULTURE CHANGE AND THE RISE OF 
PROTESTANTISM IN BRAZIL AND CHILE 265 tbl.VI (1967); Jean-Pierre Bastian, The Metamor-
phosis of Latin American Protestant Groups: A Sociohistorical Perspective, 28 LATIN AMER. RES. 
REV. 33, 41 (1993) (citation omitted). By 1970, approximately eighty percent of Chile’s Prot-
estant population belonged to a Pentecostal congregation. See READ ET AL., supra note 50, at 
102 fig.26. 
 52. See supra note 21. 
 53. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 40-41; Paul E. Sigmund, The Transformation 
of Catholic Social Thought in Latin America: Christian Democracy, Liberation Theology, and the 
New Catholic Right, in ORGANIZED RELIGION IN THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
LATIN AMERICA 41, 43 (Satya R. Pattnayak ed., 1994). 
 54. Sigmund, supra note 53, at 43. This type of “welfare-state liberalism” closely paral-
leled that of the “reformist liberal and social democratic” parties and governments in Europe, 
the United States, and the British Commonwealth. Id. at 44. 
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and instituting socialism.55 In both its general and extreme forms, 
social Christianity represented a significant fusion of political 
thought and religious belief. 
Social Christianity made its greatest inroads among Catholics, 
both lay members and clergy. Liberal elements of the historic Protes-
tant churches also adopted versions of social Christian thought;56 
however, most Evangelical and Pentecostal churches rejected social 
Christianity in favor of more traditional, conservative views.57 As the 
social Christian movement progressed between the late 1950s and 
early 1970s, its adherents formed a variety of socially and politically 
active groups and associations both within and without existing reli-
gious organizations.58 
By the early 1970s, the extreme ideological polarization that had 
torn apart Chile’s political parties59 also overwhelmed Chile’s reli-
gious climate and progressively fragmented social Christians into dif-
ferent groups. Not only did ideological differences increasingly pit 
different religious groups against one another but they also created 
severe divisions within religions.60 The Catholic Church, for exam-
ple, suffered from cleavages between its socialist clergy and members, 
moderate Church hierarchy, and conservative upper- and middle-
class constituency. In very significant and terrible ways, these 
“[p]olitical divisions made it impossible for many . . . groups to func-
tion as religious communities.”61 As one priest explained, “‘the 
 
 55. See generally ENRIQUE DUSSELL, HISTORY AND THE THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: A 
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 28-31, 140-43 (John Drury trans., 1976); Sigmund, supra 
note 53, at 51-54. 
 56. See O.E. COSTAS, THEOLOGY OF THE CROSSROADS IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN 
AMERICA: MISSIOLOGY IN MAINLINE PROTESTANTISM: 1969-1974, at 86-90 (1976). 
 57. See DAVID MARTIN, TONGUES OF FIRE: THE EXPLOSION OF PROTESTANTISM IN 
LATIN AMERICA 237-40 (1990). 
 58. See generally FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 40-59; LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 
273-89; SMITH, supra note 15, at 86-280. 
 59. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 264-306 (describing how ideological po-
larization radicalized Chilean politics and essentially split Chilean politics into leftist and con-
servative camps). 
 60. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 55-59. 
 61. Id. at 56. Regarding the politicization and resultant polarization of religious life, 
Brian Smith further explained: 
In some cases, priests sympathetic to the transition to socialism made explicit efforts 
to raise the political awareness of their new communities, and demanded of the 
membership an active commitment to the leftist cause and to the transition to so-
cialism. In other cases, the participants themselves often injected political issues into 
the small group discussions of these communities, and in religious meetings openly 
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community was quite political, because the formation it received was 
intensely Christian. It brought faith and people’s lives together, and 
people’s lives were political.’”62 
Thus, though the period 1925-1973 did not generate significant 
developments in the evolution of religious freedom, it did witness 
two events that had profound implications for the development of 
religious liberty in the immediate future. As Part III demonstrates, 
the rise of Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism and politiciza-
tion of religion through the evolution of social Christianity greatly 
influenced the manner in which religious issues developed and were 
resolved under and subsequent to the Pinochet regime. 
C. Conclusion 
The evolution of freedom of religion in Chile prior to 1973 was, 
as the preceding discussion indicates, a most interesting saga. For 
more than 100 years, Chileans did not enjoy a constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of belief and conscience, and the Catholic Church 
remained the established state religion. The evolution of de facto 
and, to a lesser extent, de jure religious freedom prior to the adop-
tion of the Constitution of 1925 resulted from a unique combina-
tion of pressures generated by increasing religious pluralism fostered 
by the immigration of non-Catholic persons and the influence of lib-
eral anticlericalism. Moreover, the eventual adoption of constitu-
tional provisions guaranteeing religious freedom and separation of 
church and state came only as the result of granting the majority re-
ligion special legal status. 
By 1973, religious freedom in Chile displayed several characteris-
tics. First, there existed a constitutionally guaranteed right to exercise 
the freedom of belief and conscience, but that right remained con-
tingent upon whether the belief in question was not contrary to such 
ambiguous concepts as morality, good usage, and public order. Sec-
ond, there also existed constitutionally guaranteed rights to exercise 
the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression. Third, though 
 
clashed with other members who had different political convictions. 
SMITH, supra note 15, at 262 (footnotes omitted). Based on interviews conducted throughout 
Chile, Smith concluded “that, especially during the latter part of the [Allende] administration, 
the problem of serious polarization of religious meetings was fairly widespread and, in [the] 
perspective [of local clergy, religious, and lay leaders], quite disruptive to effective evangeliza-
tion.” Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 181 n.6 (citation omitted). 
 62. FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 56 (citation omitted). 
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the constitutional regime no longer affirmed the union between 
church and state, Chile’s majority religion continued to enjoy special 
privileges enacted by concordat. Fourth, due largely to the rise of 
Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism, religious pluralism had 
reached unprecedented levels. Fifth, the extreme politicization of re-
ligious belief had resulted in the unification of the political and reli-
gious arenas, fragmented religious groups and organizations, and 
heightened doctrinal differences between some religious groups. 
III. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN CHILE, 1973-2000 
Part III explores the development of religious liberty in Chile be-
tween 1973 and 2000, focusing on the manner in which religious 
freedom evolved under the Pinochet regime and has developed un-
der the “democratic” civilian administrations that succeeded the 
military government. Specifically, this Part examines the evolution of 
religious liberty as revealed by three particular factors: (1) the devel-
opment of Chile’s national juridical framework; (2) the federal gov-
ernment’s perception and treatment of religious groups, beliefs, and 
practices; and (3) the popular perception and treatment of religious 
groups, beliefs, and practices. Rather than attempting a comprehen-
sive analysis of these factors, the following sections will focus on the 
Pinochet and post-Pinochet periods, respectively, before engaging in 
comparative analysis of the developments that occurred during each 
period. 
A. The Evolution of Religious Liberty Under the Pinochet Regime: 
1973-1990 
I love my country. I love the people of Chile. I am proud that Chile is 
now a country where people are free to speak, free to travel, and free to 
pursue their political and religious views. We lost all these things for 
a . . . brief period in the early 1970s. Yes, it took time to bring them 
back. But I regard it as my greatest achievement that these freedoms 
did indeed return.63 
 
 63. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, “My Wife Was in Tears, I Was Hurt and Bewildered,” 
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 8, 1998, at 2 (reprinting General Pinochet’s first public statement 
following his arrest in the United Kingdom in October 1998 in response to the government of 
Spain’s request that he be extradited to Spain to face murder and torture charges stemming 
from his dictatorship in Chile between 1973 and 1990). 
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[General Pinochet instituted] a criminal plot to execute a “systematic 
plan . . . for political objectives” of illegal detentions, kidnappings, tor-
ture, and the deaths and disappearances of thousands of people of dif-
ferent . . . categories . . . defined by leadership roles, religious beliefs, 
cultural characteristics and . . . professions . . . .64 
The Pinochet period constituted a conspicuous aberration in the 
development of religious liberty in Chile. Rather than evolving in re-
sponse to such traditional forces as classic liberalism and religious 
pluralism, freedom of religion under the Pinochet regime became 
almost exclusively a function of the military government’s authoritar-
ian, anti-Marxist national security ideology, policies, and concerns. 
This extreme politicization of religious liberty resulted in the estab-
lishment of de facto religious intolerance, as individual clergymen and 
religious organizations both suffered governmental and popular per-
secution in accordance with their perceived political position. While 
Chile’s juridical regime succeeded in expanding its protection of reli-
gious liberty through both the enactment of national legislation and 
the adoption of international treaties, de jure religious freedom fell 
victim to the regime’s political focus. In addition to placing national 
security-based restrictions on constitutional guarantees affecting the 
free exercise of religious liberty, the military government suspended 
many elements of the juridical system by ruling almost exclusively 
through emergency powers. Freedom of religion under the Pinochet 
dictatorship was thus characterized by contradictory developments 
that worked to simultaneously further and restrict religious freedom. 
1. Background: Pinochet and the institutionalization of military 
antipolitics and “protected democracy,” 1973-1990 
The dictatorial regime of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte be-
gan in dramatic, brutal fashion on September 11, 1973, with a mili-
tary coup d’etat against Chile’s constitutionally-elected, Socialist 
president, Salvador Allende, under whose leadership Chile had ex-
perienced extreme political polarization and economic deteriora-
 
 64. Home News, Press Association Newsfile, Nov. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS, Lexis 
Library, Panews File (summarizing the argument of Mr. Alun Jones QC, of the Crown Prose-
cution Service, in a hearing held before the United Kingdom’s House of Lords to determine 
whether General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte should be extradited to Spain). 
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tion.65 Rather than returning the country to civilian rule, Pinochet 
established a military government that, for the next seventeen years, 
labored to “impos[e] a new social and political order upon Chile.”66 
Based upon the ideological tenets of “military antipolitics”67 and 
virulent anticommunism, the military government’s actions and poli-
cies sought to transform Chile morally, economically, and politically 
in a manner that would safeguard la Patria (“the Fatherland”) from 
the evils of traditional civilian politics and class conflict, and achieve 
the “extirpation of Marxism.”68 Accordingly, the Pinochet regime 
revamped the national economy according to neo-liberal economic 
principles;69 replaced ideological and social pluralism “with the values 
of conservative Catholicism, class harmony, and above all [sic] Chil-
ean nationalism;”70 and modified the juridical system to legitimate 
military rule and create a “protected democracy”71 under the mili-
 
 65. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 296-309 (describing the political and 
economic conditions and events that occurred during President Allende’s administration). 
 66. Id. at 312. 
 67. Brian Loveman & Thomas M. Davies, Jr., The Politics of Antipolitics, in POLITICS 
OF ANTIPOLITICS, supra note 15, at 3. The term “military antipolitics” refers to an ideology 
held by the Latin American military that blamed “politics,” or the activities of civilian politi-
cians, as the source of the economic underdevelopment, socio-political turmoil, and corruption 
that existed throughout Latin America. See id. Influenced by the United States’ view of na-
tional security and counterrevolution agenda following the “fall” of Cuba to communism in 
1959, military antipolitics also held politics and its attendant problems responsible for the lack 
of regional stability and development and international communism’s penetration into the 
Western Hemisphere. See id. at 9-10. In the 1970s, “military antipolitics became a predomi-
nant political form in Latin America,” id. at 10, maintaining that the military best fulfilled its 
constitutionally mandated responsibility of safeguarding la Patria (“the Fatherland”) by reject-
ing traditional liberal democracy and employing direct military rule to achieve social order and 
promote economic development. See id. at 10-13. Adhering to this doctrine, the military as-
sumed power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay by 1976. See THOMAS C. 
WRIGHT, LATIN AMERICA IN THE ERA OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 155-73 (1991). 
 68. WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 164 (quoting General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Speech 
(Sept. 11, 1975), in POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS, supra note 15, 205). 
 69. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 317-21, 326-35 (detailing the Pinochet 
regime’s economic program). 
 70. WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 164. 
 71. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 323 (quoting General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte). The 
concept of “‘[p]rotected democracy,’ with the military institutions as the guarantors of the po-
litical and legal order and, implicitly, the adjudicators of their nations’ common good, perma-
nent interests, and national security requirements, has a long history in Latin America.” 
LOVEMAN, supra note 20, at 213. Professor Brian Loveman defined protected democracy as 
a political model that sets vague formal limits on the scope of legal political activity 
and reform, and it is premised on the notion that people must be protected from 
themselves and from organizations that might subvert the existing political and so-
cial order. Such subversion, even when ostensibly legal, must be repressed. Groups 
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tary’s guardianship.72 To further the government’s activities, Pino-
chet also (1) created a brutal security force responsible for ferreting 
out Marxists and other subversive elements of society and for silenc-
ing opposition to the regime’s policies and practices73 and (2) insti-
tutionalized state terrorism.74 
Though Pinochet initially received much popular support, espe-
cially from the upper- and middle-classes, the onset of a severe eco-
nomic depression in 1981 resulted in popular demand for a return to 
civilian government and widespread anti-regime demonstrations by 
the mid-1980s.75 In October 1988, Pinochet lost a constitutionally 
mandated plebiscite, allowing for the return of democratic rule in 
1990.76 The Pinochet regime formally ended with the inauguration 
 
with subversive aims . . . potentially threaten “national values,” the “permanent in-
terests of the nation,” and, in the Latin American version, “the Western Christian 
way of life.” Thus, . . . society requires guardians to defend these permanent values 
against internal and external enemies. In Latin America, the armed forces . . . have 
shouldered this historical mission, by constitutional and legislative prescription and 
also by self-assignment. 
Id. For a comprehensive discussion of protected democracy in Latin America, see generally id. 
at 213-21, and Brian Loveman, “Protected Democracies”: Antipolitics and Political Transitions 
in Latin America, 1978-1994, in POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS, supra note 15, at 366-97. 
 72. In the mid-1970s, the regime initiated “a new [juridical] institutional order,” 
LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 321, by adopting four “constitutional acts” that “amended or 
eliminated certain parts of the Constitution of 1925” in accordance with the government’s 
objectives and policies. Id. at 313. The government then promulgated a new Constitution in 
1980, incorporating the values of antipolitics, anti-Marxism, and the military’s socio-economic 
order. See id. at 269-70. The Constitution of 1980 formally established Chile as a protected 
democracy by restricting popular and civilian political authority while simultaneously expand-
ing the military’s political involvement and national security powers. See id. at 342. 
 73. See id. at 312; WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 167. 
 74. See WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 167. Acts of state terrorism included censorship, ar-
bitrary arrest, prolonged detention, “disappearing” (or kidnapping) people, torture, and sum-
mary execution and murder. See id. at 162. Pinochet justified the use of state terrorism as a 
necessary protection of human rights, stating that 
[t]he greatest possible enforcement and highest respect for Human Rights implies 
that these must not be exercised by those individuals who spread doctrines or com-
mit acts which in fact seek to abolish them. This makes it necessary to apply restric-
tions as rigorous as the circumstances may require to those who defy the juridical 
norms in force. 
LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 311 (quoting General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte). 
 75. See generally LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 344-56 (reporting the onset of economic 
depression and the Chilean public’s subsequent lack of support for the Pinochet regime be-
tween 1981 and the mid-1980s). 
 76. See Jay A. Sigler et al., Chile, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD 15, 33 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991). 
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of President Patricio Aylwin on March 11, 1990.77 Pinochet, how-
ever, retained a significant amount of political power as he, in accor-
dance with the constitutional regime, served as head of the Armed 
Forces in the new civilian administration.78 The end of the Pinochet 
dictatorship thus marked more of a transition than an end to his in-
volvement in the Chilean government. 
2. Analysis: Freedom of religion under the Pinochet regime 
A brief examination of the three factors mentioned in the intro-
duction to this Section—the development of Chile’s national juridi-
cal framework; the Chilean government’s perception and treatment 
of religious groups, beliefs, and practices; and the popular perception 
and treatment of religious groups, beliefs, and practices—reveals that 
the Pinochet period was a contradictory yet important era in the evo-
lution of religious liberty in Chile. On one hand, the nation’s juridi-
cal framework made moderate strides in protecting and defining the 
scope of those religious human rights first guaranteed by the Consti-
tution of 1925. However, the military government’s practice of sus-
pending civil rights and the politicization of both governmental and 
popular perceptions and treatment of religious beliefs and groups 
combined to prevent the full enjoyment of those religious liberty-
related freedoms and rights established by the national juridical re-
gime. The Pinochet period was thus characterized by contradictory 
developments that worked to simultaneously further and restrict reli-
gious freedom. 
a. Developments in Chile’s national juridical regime. The reli-
gious liberty-related developments that occurred in Chile’s national 
juridical regime under Pinochet involved three specific sources of na-
tional law: constitutional provisions outlining the basic freedoms and 
legal guarantees associated with religious freedom, legislative and 
administrative provisions protecting or defining religious liberty in 
specific areas of law, and international legal norms resulting from 
Chile’s obligations under international treaties.79 The developments 
that transpired within these three sources of law collectively demon-
strate that the juridical regime accomplished moderate yet notable 
 
 77. See id. at 34. 
 78. See id. at 33-34. 
 79. This discussion will not examine judicial decisions rendered by the Chilean courts 
due to the nonprecedential nature of Chilean jurisprudence and lack of relevant cases. 
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progress in defining the scope of religious liberty between 1973 and 
1990. 
 
 (1) Constitutional provisions. For the first several years follow-
ing the 1973 military coup, Chile nominally remained governed by 
the Constitution of 1925. Chilean citizens and religious groups, 
therefore, ostensibly continued to enjoy the right to freedom of con-
science, the free exercise of beliefs that did not violate public moral-
ity or order,80 and all other religious liberty-related rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution of 1925.81 
These guarantees, however, were not enforced in practice. Upon 
assuming power, the military government governed under a con-
tinuous state of siege,82 allowing it to indefinitely suspend all consti-
tutionally enumerated guarantees, freedoms, and civil liberties, in-
cluding those relating to religion.83 For its first few years in power, 
the military government thus possessed the ability to legally punish 
an individual for holding or manifesting particular religious beliefs 
that it considered unacceptable or undesirable; infringe on religious 
organizations’ capacity to own and maintain property; and abrogate 
all other constitutional rights affecting religious freedom.84 
Between December 1975 and September 1976, the junta en-
acted a series of “constitutional acts” that “amended or eliminated 
certain parts of the Constitution of 1925—without fully replacing 
it.”85 Constitutional Act Number Three,86 which defined various 
“constitutional rights and guarantees,”87 closely paralleled the Con-
stitution of 1925’s provisions governing freedom of religion. Article 
11 of the Act guaranteed “[f]reedom of conscience and expression of 
 
 80. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Sigler et al., supra note 76, at 19, 23. 
 83. See LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 310. 
 84. For examples of how the Pinochet regime exercised these powers, see infra Part 
III.A.2.b.(1). 
 85. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 313; see also Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, at 10, IACHR 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40 doc. 10 (1977) (discussing several of the changes made by the constitu-
tional acts to the Constitution of 1925). 
 86. Decreto-Ley No. 1552, Sept. 11, 1976, D.O., 13 de septiembre de 1976, trans-
lated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 85, at 10, 10-16. 
 87. Id. ch. I, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 
85, at 10. 
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all creeds and free exercise of all religions that do not violate moral 
principles, good behavior or public order, therefore, enabling the  
 
respective religious creeds to erect and maintain temples and out-
buildings according to safety and sanitation measures required by 
law.”88 
In addition, the Act protected the freedoms of assembly,89 asso-
ciation,90 and expression of opinion and information.91 Through the 
Act, however, the security-minded regime imposed new restrictions 
on these freedoms, requiring that associations formed under the con-
stitutional guarantee not be “contrary to moral principles, public or-
der [or] the security of the State,”92 granting the national courts the 
authority to limit the freedom of expression if the information circu-
lated affected “moral principles, public order, national security or the 
private life of individuals,”93 and prohibiting persons “who may have 
been at any time convicted of attempting to subvert the institutional 
order of the Republic” from not only owning, directing, or manag-
ing mass communications media, but also participating “in any 
way. . . in functions connected with the publication or broadcast of 
opinions or information.”94 
The Constitutional Act Number Three thus closely paralleled the 
Constitution of 1925’s provisions governing religious freedom while 
placing restrictions on associated rights. Unlike those provisions, 
however, some of the Act’s religious liberty-related guarantees re-
mained enforceable even though the military government continued 
to rule under emergency powers.95 Pinochet’s acceptance of the In-
 
 88. Id. art. 1(11), translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra 
note 85, at 15. 
 89. See id. art. 7, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra 
note 85, at 14. 
 90. See id. art. 9, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra 
note 85, at 15. 
 91. See id. art. 12, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra 
note 85, at 15. 
 92. Id. art. 9, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 
85, at 14. 
 93. Id. art. 12, translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 
85, at 10.  
 94. Id., translated in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 85, at 
15.   
 95. See Sigler et al., supra note 76, at 26-28. 
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ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)96 in 
1976 rendered nonderogable the right to freedom of belief and con-
science and to adopt, maintain, or refuse religious beliefs.97 The right 
to manifest one’s religion or religious beliefs, however, remained 
subject to emergency limitations established by Chilean law.98 
In 1980, the Pinochet regime replaced the Constitution of 1925 
and the constitutional acts with a new constitution.99 Echoing its ap-
proach in Constitutional Act Number Three, the government essen-
tially copied into the Constitution of 1980 the provisions of the 
Constitution of 1925 that dealt with, or related to, religious freedom 
while adding several additional security-related limitations to the 
manner in which those freedoms could be exercised. For example, 
Article 19, Section 6 guaranteed: 
Freedom of conscience, manifestation of all creeds and the free ex-
ercise of all cults which are not opposed to morals, good customs 
or public order; 
Religious communities may erect and maintain churches and their 
facilities in accordance with the conditions of safety and hygiene as 
established by the laws and ordinances. 
With respect to assets, the churches and religious communities and 
institutions representing any cult shall enjoy the rights granted and 
acknowledged by the laws currently in force. Churches and their fa-
cilities assigned exclusively for religious activities shall be exempt 
from all taxes.100 
With the exception of the last subparagraph regarding assets, the 
Section’s language closely parallels that of the Constitution of 
1925.101 
Similarly, Article 19, Section 13 approximated the corresponding 
 
 96. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The Al-
lende government had ratified the ICCPR in 1972, but it was not until 1976 that General Pi-
nochet promulgated that the Covenant should be acknowledged as national law. See Roland 
Bersier, Legal Instruments of Political Repression in Chile, INT’L. COMMISSION JURISTS REV., 
June 1985, at 54, 59. 
 97. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 98. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 99. CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) (official English translation). 
 100. Id. art. 19, no. 6. 
 101. Compare id. with supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text. 
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language in the Constitution of 1925 by recognizing “[t]he right to 
assemble peacefully without prior permission.”102 Section 15, how-
ever, followed the Constitutional Act Number Three rather than the 
Constitution of 1925, limiting the freedom of association in the in-
terest of “morals, public order and Security of the State.”103 Con-
versely, Section 12’s recognition of the freedom of expression aban-
doned the restrictions placed on that particular freedom under the 
Constitutional Act Number Three and essentially returned to the 
language used in the Constitution of 1925.104 
As with Constitutional Act Number Three, the ICCPR guaran-
teed that the Constitution of 1980’s guarantees regarding the right 
of freedom of conscience and belief remained enforceable under 
states of emergency.105 However, the remainder of the constitutional 
rights and guarantees related to religious freedom failed to become 
fully enforceable until after the re-establishment of civilian rule in 
1990 due to the Pinochet government’s continued extension of its 
emergency powers.106 Therefore, the effectiveness of the Constitu-
tion can only be gauged by examining it in the post-Pinochet period. 
Regardless of its effectiveness, however, the Constitution of 
1980 generally preserved the guarantees, if not the actual language, 
of the Constitution of 1925’s provisions relating to religious free-
dom. Indeed, the only major manner in which the Constitution of 
1980 deviated from the Constitution of 1925 lay in the imposition 
of national security-oriented limitations on the freedom to associate. 
 (2) Legislative and administrative provisions. For the first sev-
eral years of the Pinochet regime, national legislation and administra-
tive decrees were enacted on an ad hoc basis to secure the military 
government’s control over those institutions of Chilean society that 
it believed to be controlled by, or sympathetic to, Marxism. With re-
spect to religious liberty, such measures included the expulsion of 
clergy and other religious personnel,107 occupation and closure of 
 
 102. CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 13. Compare id. with supra note 
42 and accompanying text. 
 103. CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 15. Compare id. with supra note 
92 and accompanying text. 
 104. See CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 12. Compare id. with supra 
note 44 and accompanying text. 
 105. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Sigler et al., supra note 76, at 28-30. 
 107. For more information on this subject, see infra Part III.A.2.b.(1). 
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private schools and universities owned and operated by religious or-
ganizations, elimination of subsidies to privately owned schools, ap-
pointment of military rectors over church-owned universities, seizure 
of mass communications media equipment owned by religious or-
ganizations, prohibition against teaching Marxism or similar ideolo-
gies in religious schools, and the dismissal of teachers believed to be 
affiliated with any variant of Marxist thought.108 
Upon consolidating its power and implementing its socio-
political and economic agenda by the mid-1970s, the military gov-
ernment’s legislative efforts assumed a more programmed, compre-
hensive nature and outlook. By the late 1980s, this new focus led the 
regime to legislate a variety of areas and subjects that directly or indi-
rectly affected the individuals’ and religious organizations’ ability to 
maintain, manifest, and disseminate their respective religious beliefs. 
Consider, for example, the laws dealing with the following subjects. 
  (i) Discrimination on the basis of religion. Though the con-
stitutional regime did not outlaw discrimination on the basis of relig-
ion, several laws guaranteed such protection in certain circumstances 
or to specific groups. For example, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Foresight issued several decrees that prohibited employers from con-
ditioning the employment of a prospective or actual employee on his 
or her religious affiliation or beliefs.109 Also, the Ministry of the Inte-
rior stipulated that nonprofit community organizations must respect 
the religious convictions of their members.110 
  (ii) Dissemination of religious information and materials. 
Though the Pinochet regime never formally attempted to regulate or 
limit proselyting in general, one of its earliest laws potentially pre-
vented certain individuals or groups from engaging in proselytism by 
prohibiting the entry into Chilean territory of persons (either Chil-
ean nationals or foreigners) who promulgated ideas that opposed the 
country’s social order or system of government or who committed 
acts contrary to national security, public order, or the interest of the 
 
 108. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 62; Poblete, supra note 15, at 228. 
 109. See Ley No. 18,620, 27 de mayo de 1987, DIARIO OFFICIAL [hereinafter D.O.], 6 
de julio de 1987, art. 2; Ley No. 18,372, 12 de diciembre de 1984, D.O., 17 de diciembre de 
1984, art. 1. All Chilean statutes and administrative decrees cited in this Comment can be lo-
cated on the Internet by performing a search under the “Buscar Leyes” icon found at 
http://www.congreso.cl/biblioteca/biblioteca.html, the official website of Chile’s National 
Congressional Library (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional). 
 110. See Ley No. 18,893, 26 de diciembre de 1989, D.O., 30 de diciembre de 1989, art. 
3. 
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country.111 Also, another series of laws directly limited some indi-
viduals’ ability to engage in proselyting activities by disallowing 
members of cooperative societies and nonprofit community organi-
zations from proselyting.112 The text of this particular law remained 
unclear as to whether this prohibition was absolute or applied only to 
the course of a person’s involvement in such an organization.113 
  (iii) Education. Continuing pre-existing practices and 
regulations, the military government allowed private religious 
schools to freely teach their respective doctrines114 and required pub-
lic schools to offer general courses on religion and values but did not 
obligate students to take such classes in order to graduate.115 As part 
of the national education curriculum, binding on both public and 
private schools, the government also mandated that nonreligion 
courses teach about general religious themes and practices.116 In 
both public and private schools, teachers of courses about particular 
religions or religious beliefs had to be certified by the local ecclesias-
tical authority of that religion.117 Also, parents of students attending 
a private religious school could formally request that their children 
not be educated according to the beliefs of the sponsoring religion; 
however, they could not demand that the school provide instruction 
about a different religious creed.118 
  (iv) Military service. Though it did not recognize the right 
of conscientious objection, the regime allowed ministers and “reli-
gious persons” (an undefined term that theoretically included cler-
gymen, monks and nuns, missionaries, and other similar persons) of 
all religions to receive exemptions from compulsory military ser-
vice.119 The granting of such exemptions, however, required that the 
 
 111. See Decreto-Ley No. 604, 9 de agosto de 1974, D.O., 10 de agosto de 1974, arts 1-
2. 
 112. See Ley No. 18,893, art. 3; Decreto No. 502, 1 de septiembre de 1978, D.O., 9 de 
noviembre de 1978. 
 113. See Ley No. 18,893, art. 3. 
 114. See Decreto No. 924, 12 de agosto de 1983, D.O., 7 de enero de 1984, art. 5. 
 115. See id.; Decreto No. 76, 7 de mayo de 1985, D.O., 15 de mayo de 1985, art. 2. 
 116. See, e.g., Decreto No. 43, 19 de marzo de 1984, D.O., 17 de mayo de 1984, art. 3 
(requiring courses on plastic arts to teach about the religious use and significance of masks). 
 117. See Decreto No. 924, art. 9; Decreto No. 1191, 24 de octubre de 1978, D.O., 28 
de noviembre de 1978, 28. 
 118. See Decreto No. 924, art. 5. 
 119. See Decreto-Ley No. 2306, 2 de agosto de 1978, D.O., 12 de septiembre de 1978, 
art. 17(6); Decreto No. 244, 1 de marzo de 1979, D.O., 3 de mayo de 1979, art. 43(6). 
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individual’s petition for an exemption be (1) accompanied by an offi-
cial statement by his or her religious superior confirming the  
 
 
petitioner’s religious status or position and (2) approved by the Di-
rector General of the Ministry of National Defense.120 
  (v) Prisoners’ rights. As part of the government’s program 
for rehabilitating prisoners, incarcerated persons were guaranteed 
participation in religious activities.121 The Ministry of Justice’s De-
partment of Rehabilitation was assigned the responsibility of provid-
ing for and supervising such activities.122 
  (vi) Taxation. In addition to the constitutional provisions 
declaring property and facilities used for religious purposes to be ex-
empt from taxation, the regime enacted several laws that exempted 
certain religious organizations from having to pay stamp taxes,123 
municipal registration fees and taxes,124 and various import duties.125 
Also, individuals or other juridical persons who donated funds or 
other materials to a religious organization or group could receive a 
tax deduction in accordance with their donation if their donation 
went to constructing religious edifices on land granted by the gov-
ernment to that particular organization.126 
  (vii) Terrorism. One of the most intriguing laws enacted 
by the Pinochet government involved protecting religious authorities 
from assassination and the infliction of bodily harm. Included among 
those acts considered to be “terrorist acts” were attempts to take the 
life of, or inflict bodily harm upon, religious authorities.127 Unfortu-
nately, the law did not state the meaning of the term “religious au-
thorities” and was passed after government security forces and non-
 
 120. See Decreto-Ley No, 2306, art. 17(6); Decreto No. 244, art. 43(6). 
 121. See Decreto-Ley No. 2859, 12 de septiembre de 1979, D.O., 15 de septiembre de 
1979, art. 8(b)(2). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Decreto No. 2106, 31 de diciembre de 1974, D.O., 16 de enero de 1975, art. 
1(6). 
 124. See Decreto-Ley No. 3063, 24 de diciembre de 1979, D.O., 29 de diciembre de 
1979, art. 27. 
 125. See Decreto-Ley No. 3475, 29 de agosto de 1980, D.O., 4 de septiembre de 1980, 
art. 23(9). 
 126. See Decreto-Ley No. 574, 10 de junio de 1974, D.O., 11 de octubre de 1974, art. 
188. 
 127. See Ley No. 18,314, 16 de mayo de 1984, D.O., 17 de mayo de 1984, art. 1(2). 
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government paramilitary groups had executed or tortured many 
Catholic and Protestant clerics.128 
Though none of these laws individually made an overwhelmingly 
significant impression on the development of religious liberty in 
Chile, they collectively added substance and definition to the na-
tional juridical regime defining and governing religious freedom. 
Thanks to such laws, for example, workers enjoyed protection 
against discrimination on the basis of religion, and prisoners received 
the guarantee that they would and could engage in religious activi-
ties. Moreover, parents received the right to enroll their children in a 
private school operated by a religious organization while controlling 
the religious formation that their children received. The military 
government’s legislative provisions thus further defined the manner 
in which religious belief could be maintained, manifested, and dis-
seminated. 
 (3) International legal norms. Pinochet’s government ac-
knowledged as legally binding two international instruments that re-
lated to religious liberty: the ICCPR in 1976129 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)130 
in 1989 (less than one year prior to the regime’s end).131 It should 
be recognized, however, that the ICCPR had more significance than 
the ICESCR during the Pinochet period, because the ICCPR both 
became obligatory more than a decade earlier and, as the following 
discussion demonstrates, addressed a greater number of issues associ-
ated with religious freedom. 
With respect to the development of religious liberty in Chile, the 
ICCPR’s importance stemmed primarily from its institution of vari-
ous rules and guarantees not recognized in the country’s various 
constitutional or legislative provisions. Examples of such rules and 
guarantees included: (1) a general prohibition against discrimination 
on the basis of religion;132 (2) the right to adopt a religion or belief 
of one’s choice, either individually or with others, and to manifest 
 
 128. For more information regarding the killing and torturing of religious personnel, see 
infra Part III.A.2.b. 
 129. For information on the Pinochet government’s acceptance of the ICCPR, see supra 
note 96. 
 130. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 131. See generally Decreto No. 326, 28 de abril de 1989, D.O., 27 de mayo de 1989. 
 132. See ICCPR, supra note 96, at 173, art. 2(1). 
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that religion or belief in “worship, observance, practice and teach-
ing”;133 (3) the prohibition of coercion in an individual’s decision to 
adopt or refuse to adopt religious beliefs;134 (4) the prohibition of 
the advocacy of “religious hatred that constitutes incitement to dis-
crimination, hostility or violence”;135 (5) the protection of children 
against discrimination on the basis of religion;136 (6) the guarantee 
that the law will not discriminate on the basis of religion;137 and (7) 
the right of religious minorities to profess and practice their relig-
ion.138 It should be remembered that the Chilean juridical regime in 
some fashion already recognized, or would thereafter sanction, sev-
eral of these rights, including the general freedom of religion, belief, 
or conscience,139 and the ability of parents to ensure the religious and 
moral teaching of their children.140 
Perhaps the ICCPR’s most significant provision affirmed the in-
violability of religious freedom by prohibiting the derogation of the 
right to exercise the freedom of conscience and belief even in emer-
gency situations.141 With this provision, the ICCPR constituted the 
only element of Chile’s juridical framework that, at least after 1976, 
unconditionally guaranteed the freedom of belief and conscience and 
right to adopt, maintain, or refuse religious beliefs. The right to 
manifest one’s religion or religious beliefs, however, remained sub-
ject to emergency limitations established by Chilean law.142 
Ratification of the ICESCR in 1989 bolstered Chile’s obligation 
to observe two notable provisions of the ICCPR. The ICESCR, like 
the ICCPR, proscribed all discrimination on the basis of religion143 
and bestowed upon parents the right to “ensure the religious and 
moral education of their children in conformity with their own con-
victions.”144 Chile’s ratification of the ICESCR consequently rein-
forced its commitment to honor these two provisions of the ICCPR. 
 
 133. Id. at 178, art. 18(1). 
 134. Id. at 178, art. 18(2). 
 135. See id. at 178, art. 20(2). 
 136. See id. at 178, art. 24(1). 
 137. See id. at 179, art. 26. 
 138. See id. at 179, art. 27. 
 139. See id. at 173, art. 18(1). 
 140. See id. at 173, art. 18(4). 
 141. See id. at 174, art. 4(1)-(2). 
 142. See id. at 178, art. 18(3). 
 143. See ICESCR, supra note 130, at 5, art. 2(2). 
 144. Id. at 8, art. 13(3). 
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 (4) Conclusion. Collectively, the religious freedom-related ju-
ridical developments discussed above indicate that during the Pino-
chet dictatorship Chile’s national juridical regime made relative pro-
gress in defining and protecting the scope of religious freedom in 
Chilean society. Though it placed new national security-related limi-
tations on the freedom of association, the Constitution of 1980 
maintained the Constitution of 1925’s guarantees and limitations re-
garding the freedoms of belief and conscience, assembly, and expres-
sion. Moreover, various legislative provisions enacted by the military 
government made moderate advances in the application of religious 
freedom to diverse areas of law and society. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, however, the military regime’s acceptance of the ICCPR in-
troduced new religious rights and broadened the scope of those rec-
ognized by Chile’s constitutional or legislative provisions. The 
Pinochet period thus achieved moderate progress in broadening the 
meaning and scope of religious freedom in Chile’s juridical regime. 
b. Governmental perception and treatment of religious groups, doc-
trines, and practices. Throughout Pinochet’s dictatorship, the mili-
tary government viewed religious doctrines and activities in the same 
manner it viewed the rest of Chilean society—according to the poli-
ticized values, goals, and fears associated with the regime’s anti-
Marxist interpretation of military antipolitics and national security. 
The Pinochet regime consequently perceived the beliefs and actions 
of both religious groups and individuals as antagonistic and danger-
ous if they appeared to sympathize with or defend Marxism or as 
supportive and beneficial if they coincided with the military’s think-
ing and goals. Not surprisingly, perceived opposition to the govern-
ment generated harassment, persecution, torture, and even death; 
perceived support, however, resulted in favoritism and the enjoyment 
of special privileges. 
 (1) Government treatment of opposition groups. The manner in 
which the military government treated clergymen and religious 
groups perceived as supporting Marxism or opposing the govern-
ment forms the most widely publicized and studied aspect of reli-
gious liberty in the Pinochet period.145 Most scholars who address 
this theme, however, focus exclusively on the military’s violation of 
press, legal, or human rights,146 failing to note that the government’s 
 
 145. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 146. See id. 
THU-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:36 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1216 
oppressive treatment of clergymen and religious organizations  
 
directly affronted the constitutional right to free exercise of belief 
and liberty of conscience. 
Viewed generally, the regime’s treatment of religious authorities 
and groups that it perceived as adversarial progressed through three 
distinct periods or phases. First, from 1973 to 1976, the government 
brutally repressed individual clergymen and religious groups believed 
to adhere to, or sympathize with, Marxist beliefs.147 Though the 
military did not expressly focus on religion as part of its anti-Marxist 
campaign, neither did it exempt religious issues and activities from its 
persecution of leftist ideas and groups.148 Consequently, government 
forces arrested, detained, expelled, assaulted, tortured, or killed a to-
tal of several hundred “religious persons” (including Protestant min-
isters and missionaries as well as Catholic priests, monks, and nuns) 
who allegedly belonged to leftist political groups (e.g., Catholics for 
Socialism, the Chilean Communist Party), provided aid and comfort 
to alleged Marxists, or actively espoused liberation theology or other 
liberal variations of social Christianity.149 Also, in 1974 the govern-
 
 147. Note that in 1975, a Chilean Jew unsuccessfully attempted to link the detainment 
and supposed death of his son with anti-Semitism, alleging that “there [was an] anti-Semitic 
element in [a Chilean government] plot to identify [a] series of bodies [that] turned up . . . in 
Argentina as those of Chilean extremists.” Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. 
Department of State 1 (Aug. 1975) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Telegram August 
1975]. The United States Embassy in Chile, however, rejected the claim as “unlikely.” Id. The 
Embassy’s conclusion concurred with the findings of a 1974 human rights report authored by 
the Chicago Commission of Inquiry into the Status of Human Rights in Chile, which visited 
Chile several months after the coup to investigate human rights conditions. See CHICAGO 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE CHICAGO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE 
STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE 1-2 (1974) [hereinafter CHICAGO COMMISSION]. In its 
report, the Commission asserted that “there is no campaign of anti-semitism [sic] by the 
Junta” due the regime’s fear “of projecting a fascist image abroad.” Id. at 25. Moreover, the 
Commission noted that General Gustavo Leigh, a member of the junta, provided the head of 
Chile’s Jewish community with assurances “that there will be no anti-semitism.” Id. 
 148. Indeed, the regime’s predisposition to equate political attitudes with religious beliefs 
remains clearly illustrated by the following statement made by General Pinochet about a 
Catholic priest who was “disappeared” by security forces: “He is not a priest, he’s a Marxist!” 
“Solo así Cantan los Marxistas”, NOVEDADES, Feb. 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Noveda File (“[E]se no es un cura, es un marxista!”). 
 149. See, e.g., Human Rights in Chile: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l. Orgs., 94th 
Cong. 2-3 (1975) (prepared statement of Rev. Daniel A. Panchot, C.S.C.) (detainment, tor-
ture, and expulsion of Catholic priest in November 1975) [hereinafter Hearings]; SHEILA 
CASSIDY, AUDACITY TO BELIEVE 165-331 (1977) (government attack on a religious residence; 
arrest, torture, detainment, and expulsion of physician and prospective Catholic nun for 
providing medical aid to alleged leftist terrorist); CHICAGO COMMISSION, supra note 147, at 4 
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ment disbanded two minority religious groups that, in its view, 
threatened public morality and order.150 
 
(“at least three” priests killed, 130 expelled, and “many tortured” between September 1973 
and February 1974); TERESA DONOSO LOERO, LOS CRISTIANOS POR EL SOCIALISMO EN 
CHILE 212, 223-24, 237-38, 240, 243, 256, 265-66 (3d ed. 1976) (expulsion of Bishop 
Helmut Frenz, head of the Lutheran Church in Chile and co-president of COPACHI in 1975 
for engaging in “anti-national activities” and endangering Chile’s national security; detainment 
of various Catholic priests and religious personnel for allegedly participating in leftist terrorist 
forces and pro-Marxist activities, providing aid to Marxists and terrorists, and stashing weap-
ons); Juan Carlos Garcia, One Man Who Rejoices in Arrest of Pinochet, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 
24, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Tstar File (arrest and detainment of Bishop 
Helmut Frenz in 1973 for harboring fugitives); Luis Mendez, Denuncia Obispo Luterano Per-
secuciones de Pinochet, EL NORTE, Feb. 10, 1998, at 12, available in 1998 WL 
6411791(Catholic priest “disappeared” by progovernment forces in 1974); Pinochet’s Hench-
man Tortured My Brother to Death but Only Now Can I Tell His Story, EXPRESS, Feb. 29, 
2000, available in 2/29/00 WL BSX-DYEXP (Catholic priest tortured to death in 1973) 
[hereinafter Pinochet’s Henchman]; Reconoce soldado chileno ser asesino de sacerdote, REFORMA, 
Mar. 16, 1998, at 7, available in DIALOG, File No. 749 [hereinafter Reconoce soldado] (for-
mer Chilean soldier admitted killing Catholic priest in 1973); Telegram from U.S. Embassy in 
Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-2 (Dec. 1975) (copy on file with author) (release of five 
Catholic priests detained for aiding leftist terrorists); Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago 
to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-3 (Nov. 1975) (copy on file with author) (several Catholic nuns de-
tained, for aiding members of terrorist organizations); Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santi-
ago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-2 (Oct. 1975) (copy on file with author) (detainment of two 
Presbyterian pastors due to affiliation with “subversive organizations”; status as “religious lead-
ers” prompted security forces to take “special care” with them) [hereinafter Telegram October 
1975]; Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-3 (June 1974) (copy 
on file with author) (prolonged detainment of Catholic priests who opposed military’s seizure 
of Catholic-owned school). 
  It should be noted that in 1991 the Chilean National Truth Commission deter-
mined that only three “religious” persons had died as victims of government agents, politically 
motivated private citizens, or political violence between 1973 and 1990. See NATIONAL 
COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 904 tbl.9. The Commission’s report, however, directly con-
flicts with other accounts, which collectively indicate that at least five religious persons were 
killed between 1973 and 1984. See CHICAGO COMMISSION, supra note 147, at 4, 10, 12 (at 
least three priests killed in the first several months following the coup, including Fathers Joan 
Alsina and Gerardo Poblete); Jackson Diehl, ‘This Isn’t Just Poland, This is Chile Again’, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1986, at A27 (Father Andres Jarland killed by police during September 
1984 demonstration); Pinochet’s Henchmen, supra (Father Michael Woodward tortured to 
death in 1973); see also Reconoce Soldado, supra (former Chilean soldier, Nelson Banados, ad-
mitted killing Father Joan Alsina in 1973); cf. Tito Drago, Rights-Chile: Spanish Judge Issues 
Indictment Against Pinochet, Global Information Network, Dec. 10, 1998, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File (Spanish judge issued indictment against Pinochet, charging 
Pinochet with killing and/or torturing approximately 2000 people, including “seven clergy 
and religious workers”). 
 150. The expelled groups included (1) the Inner Religion of Siloism, a nontraditional 
religious group suspected of being “a politically motivated group with connections to” leftist 
terrorist organizations, Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1-2 
(Mar. 1974) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Telegram March 1974], and (2) the Di-
vine Light Mission, formed by followers of the guru Maharaj Jigroup, see JUAN GUILLERMO 
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Second, between 1976 and 1982, the military government at-
tempted to intimidate religious organizations into ceasing their indi-
vidual and collective efforts to promote a return to civilian rule and 
provide aid to victims of governmental oppression. This period wit-
nessed two important developments with respect to the govern-
ment’s perception of opposition religious groups. First, various reli-
gious organizations, and especially the Catholic Church, issued 
increasingly harsh criticisms of the regime’s human rights practices 
and called for a return to civilian government.151 Second, 
interdenominational efforts to provide assistance to victims of the 
regime’s repression culminated in the creation of the Vicariate of 
Solidarity. The Vicariate, though, was not the first organization of its 
kind. As early as 1973, the Catholic Church had joined with several 
historic and Pentecostal Protestant churches, the Greek Orthodox 
Church, and several Jewish organizations to form the National 
Committee to Aid Refugees (CONAR), which assisted leftist 
immigrants who had arrived in Chile during the Allende years to 
emigrate from Chile,152 and the Cooperative Committee for Peace in 
Chile (COPACHI), which provided legal and other aid to persons 
who had suffered from the military’s repressive activities.153 However, 
internal divisions and pressure from the government forced 
COPACHI to dissolve in November 1975.154 
In 1976, the Catholic Church joined with a lesser number of 
non-Catholic organizations to form the Vicariate of Solidarity, which 
provided a partial umbrella of protection for numerous community 
 
PRADO O., SECTAS JUVENILES EN CHILE 90-92 (1984), which the government accused of be-
ing a “financial racket[]” and teaching values that opposed public order. Telegram March 
1974, supra, at 2 (mislabeling The Divine Light Mission as “Luz Blanca”). 
 151. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 63-65. 
 152. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 313; see also Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 163 (“By 
February 1974, CONAR had helped approximately five thousand foreigners (who had come to 
Chile during the Allende years as a haven of freedom from repressive regimes in other parts of 
Latin America) to leave Chile safely.”). 
 153. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 61-62; LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 32-36, 
38-51; see also Hearings, supra note 149, at 1-2; CASSIDY, supra note 149, at 126-27. 
 154. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 62; LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 317; see also 
CASSIDY, supra note 149, at 128-29 (arrest, prolonged detainment, and torture of three female 
COPACHI staff members); THOMAS C. WRIGHT & RODY OÑATE, FLIGHT FROM CHILE: 
VOICES OF EXILE 47-48 (Irene B. Hodgson trans., 1998) (comments by volunteer with 
COPACHI about government’s efforts to force COPACHI’s dissolution by putting “heavy 
pressure” on Church hierarchy and making “systematic effort” to denounce individual mem-
bers). 
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organizations, research institutes, and human-rights defense 
groups. . . . The Vicariate also extended material support to the ur-
ban and rural poor, provided technical assistance to small farmers,  
published magazines for popular education, and maintained records 
on political detainees and “disappeared” persons . . . .155 
Together, these functions rendered the Vicariate “the single most 
important source of moral opposition to the dictatorship.”156 
Perceiving these developments as evidence of disloyalty, subver-
siveness, and “naive moralis[m],”157 the Pinochet regime responded 
by attempting to intimidate the religious organizations involved into 
ceasing their criticisms and dissolving the Vicariate.158 Though these 
 
 155. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 317; see also FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 66-67; 
Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 165-66. For a comprehensive discussion of the Vicariate’s ac-
tivities through the mid-1980s, see generally JUAN IGNACIO GUTIÉRREZ FUENTE, CHILE: LA 
VICARÍA DE LA SOLIDARIDAD (1986), LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 53-128. 
 156. LOVEMAN, supra note 15, at 317. It should also be noted that following the disso-
lution of COPACHI in 1975, the Methodist, Pentecostal, and Orthodox churches—none of 
which participated in the Vicariate—formed a new ecumenical social institution, the Social As-
sistance Foundation of the Christian Churches (FASIC). See Chile: Ecumenical Body Supports 
Program for Returned Exiles, Inter Press Service, Jan. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Inpres File. Like the Vicariate, FASIC was formed in 1976 and “committed [itself] to 
the defence [sic] of human rights in a Christian perspective” by providing legal aid, social assis-
tance, and medical treatment to political prisoners and their families. TREVOR BEESON & 
JENNY PEARCE, A VISION OF HOPE: THE CHURCHES AND CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 151 
(1984). Together with the Chilean government, FASIC also established a prisoner release pro-
gram that allowed “sentenced political prisoners to commute their sentence to exile, provided 
another country [was] willing to receive them.” Id. Internationally, FASIC worked with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “in assisting those refugees 
who . . . decided to return to Chile and [were] legally allowed to return but suffer[ed] consid-
erable difficulties in re-adapting and finding employment.” Id. Though FASIC paralleled the 
Vicariate in its provision of many forms of aid to Chilean society, FASIC’s lack of opposition to 
the regime and close ties to the Protestant community (which largely supported, and was ac-
tively courted by, the regime, see infra notes 172-178 and accompanying text) apparently 
maintained the organization within the military government’s good graces. 
 157. FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 68. 
 158. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 319. The government’s chosen methods of intimida-
tion included: (1) expelling religious authorities, see PENNY LERNOUX, CRY OF THE PEOPLE: 
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE RISE OF FASCISM, TORTURE, AND MURDER AND THE 
PERSECUTION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA 298 (1980) (government’s 
practice of harassing, detaining, and expelling clergy); SMITH, supra note 15, at 332 tbl.9.3 
(loss/expulsion of 64 non-Chilean Catholic priests between 1975 and 1979); (2) using its 
control of the national press to criticize the organizations’ activities and views, see LOWDEN, 
supra note 15, at 60-61(national media criticized the Vicariate and the Catholic Church of 
conspiring with leftist groups); SMITH, supra note 15, at 319 (government-controlled media 
unleashed “public attacks and harassment” against Vicariate); Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 
175 (by late 1977, government spokespersons attempted to discredit Vicariate by charging that 
it “was harboring Marxists and taking money from abroad to support political dissidents in 
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measures further polarized Catholic-State relations and complicated 
the Vicariate’s work, the religious organizations’ criticisms and social 
 
Chile”); see also LERNOUX, supra at 298 (Pinochet regime attempted to use resources provided 
by United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to discredit Catholic Church through use 
of “smear campaigns in the government-controlled media”); (3) conducting police raids on 
houses of worship and religious residences, see Smith, Catholic Church, supra note 15, at 331-
32 (“Various diocesan affiliates of the Vicariate were raided, rectories and convents in low-
income areas continued to be closely watched, and local [base communities] working closely 
with the Vicariate harassed.”); Charles A. Krause, For U.S. Priest in Chile, ‘Liberation Theology’ 
Means Bringing Dignity to Poor, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1979, at A16 (security forces searched 
home of Catholic priest “looking for guns, subversive literature or possibly persons wanted for 
questioning in connection with labor or political activities”); (4) attempting to cut off foreign 
funding provided to the Catholic Church (and other Chilean churches as well) by the Inter-
American Foundation (IAF), see SMITH, supra note 15, at 328-29 (attempts to freeze IAF 
funds entering Chile through Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) failed due to interna-
tional pressure); and (5) detaining and harassing Church officials and Vicariate employees, vol-
unteers, and facilities. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 62; see also PENNY LERNOUX, 
NOTES ON A REVOLUTIONARY CHURCH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA 17-18 (1978) 
[hereinafter LERNOUX, NOTES ] (government officials’ violent reception of three Catholic 
bishops, all of whom were critical of regime, upon bishops’ return to Chile from visit to Ecua-
dor); LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 58-59 (expulsion of attorneys affiliated with the Vicariate); 
Smith, Chile, supra note 15, at 175 (“Diocesan affiliates of the [V]icariate in various parts of 
the country were raided and personnel harassed. . . . Rectories, convents, and base communi-
ties experienced similar raids and surveillance, and in 1980 harassment tactics against 
neighborhood church projects . . . increased for a time once again.”); Krause, supra, at A19 
(arrest of Catholic priest for participating in antigovernment demonstration in 1978); Tele-
gram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 2 (Oct. 1976) (copy on file with 
author) (detention of Catholic Bishop of Talca’s private secretary “another specific example of 
[government] pressure” against the Church); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 98TH CONG., 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1982, at 441 (1983) [hereinafter 
1982 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (“Some [Catholic] Church activists and human rights law-
yers have during 1982 been anonymously threatened.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 97TH CONG., 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1981, at 376 (1982) [hereinafter 
1981 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (“[Catholic] Church activists and human rights lawyers have 
been anonymously threatened.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 97TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1980, at 379 (1981) [hereinafter 1980 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTS] (“In a number of instances, church property has been the target of attacks carried 
out by assailants who have not been identified.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 96TH CONG., 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1979, at 274-75 (1980) (“[The 
Catholic Church’s defense of human rights] has resulted in occasional tensions with the Gov-
ernment, but sporadic harassment of the Church’s social action programs has not spilled over 
into the area of religious teaching and worship.”). 
  Notably, the Catholic Church occasionally responded to the government’s mis-
treatment of Church officials and personnel by using, or at least considering using, its spiritual 
authority against those government employees involved. In 1976, for example, the Church 
excommunicated a government official and several security agents involved in the hostile recep-
tion given to three Chilean bishops upon their return to Chile. See LERNOUX, NOTES, supra, 
at 18; cf. Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 1 (Jan. 1976) (copy 
on file with author) (reporting that a meeting of the Chilean Episcopal Conference “consid-
ered [the] possibility of Church excommunication of people implicated in torture”). 
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services activities continued unabated.159 
In addition to taking action against vocal opposition groups, the 
military government also continued its practice of cracking down on 
“pseudo-religious organizations” that allegedly acted as “servants of  
international communism.”160 For example, in July 1976, the gov-
ernment “briefly detained several members of the ‘Light and Love’ 
mission.”161 Responding to the regime’s actions, the United States 
Embassy in Santiago observed that “[w]hile in general the [govern-
ment of Chile] has not restricted religious freedoms, it apparently 
views certain sects as not qualifying as full fledged [sic] religious 
groups and treats them differently.”162 
The third phase of the government’s treatment of opposition re-
ligious organizations occurred between 1982 and the return of de-
mocracy in 1990. During this period, the Catholic Church and other 
religious organizations sought a less confrontational relationship 
with the regime and, in response to the 1980 plebiscite that ratified 
continued military rule under the Constitution of 1980, reduced 
their calls for a return to civilian rule.163 However, they continued to 
both support the Vicariate of Solidarity and condemn the regime’s 
human rights abuses.164 Also, with the beginning of massive anti-
Pinochet political protests in May 1983, individual clergymen in-
creasingly participated in and organized street demonstrations 
against the regime.165 
Despite the churches’ efforts to improve relations with Pino-
chet’s government, the military continued to interpret the Vicariate’s 
activities, public criticisms of torture and human rights violations, 
and the participation of clergymen in demonstrations against the re-
gime as “acts of hostility to be answered in kind.”166 Government 
forces accordingly continued to denounce the alleged incompetence 
of religious authorities and to intimidate and harass Vicariate em-
 
 159. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 66-67; see also SMITH, supra note 15, at 319. 
 160. Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Santiago to U.S. Dep’t of State 2 (Aug. 1976) 
(copy on file with author). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 115. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. at 117-19; LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 107. 
 166. FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 117. 
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ployees and programs.167 In addition, government forces arrested, as-
saulted, expelled, or killed an undetermined number of clergymen 
who participated in and organized demonstrations against the regime 
and attacked church facilities where demonstrators planned their ac-
tions or sought to find refuge.168 This third phase in the govern-
 
 167. See id. at 116-17, 130; see also LOWDEN, supra note 15, at 111 (killing of Vicariate 
staff member), 112-15 (government accused Catholic Church of inciting violence); Smith, 
Chile, supra note 15, at 177 (attacks on Church and its supporters included “the reappearance 
of charges of subversion against church groups . . . , more expulsions of foreign clergy, and a 
return to police harassment and arrest of [V]icariate and [local lay] leaders”); Grace Gibson & 
Ana Pena, Vicaria (II): La Prueba de la Blancura, QUÉ PASA, Mar. 2, 1989, at 19-20, avail-
able in DIALOG, Info-South File (accusations that Vicariate provided aid to assassin of Chil-
ean policeman, was associated with leftist terrorist groups, and had disreputable financial deal-
ings); Bradley Graham, Chilean Oppressed Turn to Vicariate, WASH. POST, May 2, 1987, at 
G12 (prosecution of lawyer and doctor on Vicariate’s staff for acting as “accomplices after the 
fact” to killing of policeman by gunman to whom Vicariate personnel provided refuge and 
medical treatment); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 100TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, at 420-21 (1988) [hereinafter 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTS] (Vicariate investigated by military prosecutor, Vicariate employees threatened, and 
unidentified parties broke into and/or searched church offices and premises); U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, 100TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1986,  at 437 
(1987) [hereinafter 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (anonymous attacks against property and 
officials of Catholic Church included attempted assassination of two bishops and threats 
against lay workers); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 99TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1985, at 457 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] 
(Catholic Church attacked by unidentified groups, which bombed churches, sprayed churches 
with gunfire, kidnapped and mistreated lay workers, broke into church property and files, and 
threatened church officials or priests); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 99TH CONG., COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1984, at 462, 466 (1985) [hereinafter 1984 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (“[T]he Government prohibited media coverage of a pastoral 
statement by the Archbishop of Santiago . . . . Other steps were taken throughout the country 
to limit the expression of the Catholic church . . . . Some [Catholic] church activists and hu-
man rights lawyers have occasionally been threatened anonymously.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
98TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1983, at 504 (1984) 
[hereinafter 1983 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS] (“Some [Catholic] Church activists and human 
rights lawyers were anonymously threatened during 1983, but such incidents apparently de-
clined toward the end of 1983.”). 
 168. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 117, 121-22, 130; LOWDEN, supra note 15, 
at 108-09; see also 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 437 (three French 
priests expelled, other clergymen detained, and two U.S. priests had residence permits limited); 
1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 457 (“[S]everal [foreign priests] were de-
tained for short periods for involvement in protest demonstrations against the Government.”); 
1984 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 462-63 (one French national priest shot 
during demonstration, and one U.S. priest expelled for involvement in anti-torture campaign); 
100 Priests and Nuns Arrested in Chile, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 24, 1986, at B2 (“More than 
100 priests, nuns and church workers were arrested after Chilean police broke up a protest 
march.”); Chile Tightens Screws Again by Booting 3 French Priests, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 11, 
1986, at C5 (expulsion of three French priests for possessing political literature); Jackson 
Diehl, Church Leader Assails Chile’s State of Seige, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1984, at A1(“In the 
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ment’s treatment of perceived opposition from religious groups thus 
essentially combined the individualized repression of the first phase 
with the organization-oriented intimidation of the second. 
The Pinochet regime’s political views and intolerance of dissent 
thus caused it to perceive the religiously based beliefs and activities of 
both individual clergymen and religious organizations as adversarial 
to the regime. The beliefs and activities at issue generally originated 
from liberation theology and other more moderate variants of social 
Catholicism that viewed the protection of human rights and democ-
ratic government as part of a religion’s parochial duty. Viewing such 
beliefs as byproducts of Marxism, the military engaged in several 
phases of repression that, at the very least, inhibited the ability of 
hundreds of clergymen and several religious organizations (especially 
the Catholic Church) to maintain and manifest their beliefs, contrary 
to the guarantees provided by the national juridical regime. 
 (2) Government treatment of perceived nonopposition groups. 
The Pinochet regime actively worked to cultivate support among 
those religious groups that it perceived as being supportive of the re-
gime’s actions and goals. To be sure, there were many groups, prin-
cipally among the Pentecostal and historic Protestant churches, but 
also among conservative Catholics, that strongly believed in and de-
fended the military’s actions and policies. For example, shortly after 
the 1973 coup, a group of thirty-two relatively prominent Protestant 
and Pentecostal churches published a statement supporting the  
 
last week, the government has banned from Chile a priest heading the church’s human rights 
organization and has censored [Santiago Archbishop Juan Francisco] Fresno’s last two public 
statements.”); Diehl, supra note 149, at A27 (Catholic priest killed by police during 1984 
demonstration became “militant priest-martyr” in local community); Bradley Graham, Chile 
Shifts on Priests’ Ouster, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1986, at A29 (government reconsidered order 
to expel three French priests after Chilean Cardinal “warned that the expulsions would have a 
disruptive effect on the country”); Tim Johnson, Charges of Violence Rock Chile Government, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 27, 1985, at 9, 9 (“The Roman Catholic Church asked 
Chile’s Supreme Court last week to name a special prosecuting judge to investigate 72 cases in 
which unidentified armed squads have kidnapped and wounded opposition and religious activ-
ists.”); Stephen Kinzer, Church in Chile Doesn’t Just Pray for Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 
1983, at E3 (progovernment forces responsible for “beatings and arrests of [Catholic] sacris-
tans and chapel custodians” as well as vandalizing two Catholic radio stations); Pinochet Ignores 
Church Plea, Orders More Raids on Slums, CHICAGO TRIB., May 10, 1986, at C9 (police con-
fiscated six videocassettes “for a documentary about everyday life there” from Catholic priest); 
Priests Held in Chilean Siege, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 9, 1986, at C14 (security forces raided 
religious residence and arrested six Catholic priests, including two United States and three 
French citizens). 
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military’s actions in exterminating Marxism,169 and several thousand 
Pentecostals attended a Te Deum religious service held for General 
Pinochet and his government in conjunction with the dedication of a 
new Pentecostal cathedral in Santiago.170 Similarly, a conservative 
Catholic group called the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Fam-
ily, and Property (TFP) praised the coup and criticized those who 
opposed military rule.171 
 
 169. See Declaración de la Iglesia Evangélica de Chile (Dec. 13, 1974), reprinted in LA 
IGLESIA Y LA JUNTA MILITAR DE CHILE (DOCUMENTOS), supra note 15, at 100-03; see also 
Situación de las iglesias evangélicas de Chile, supra note 47, at 107-26 (analyzing and criticizing 
the statement published by the Pentecostal groups); COSTAS, supra note 56, at 145-47 (dis-
cussing the origin of the Pentecostal statement and advancing the idea that it resulted from 
government pressure). In 1987, United States television evangelist Jimmy Swaggart visited 
Chile and vocally supported Pinochet, asking “his audience in Santiago to ‘pray for General 
Pinochet and his beautiful wife.’” Richard N. Ostling, Offering the Hope of Heaven, TIME, 
Mar. 16, 1987, at 69, 69. 
  By far the most disturbing report of Protestant support for the regime involved 
claims by Catholic officials and human rights groups that Chilean security forces established a 
prison camp and torture center at Colonia Dignidad, an agricultural and religious commune 
founded in southern Chile during the early 1960s by evangelical minister Paul Schaeffer and 
300 of his German immigrant followers. See Joshua Hammer, Hell on Earth, NEWSWEEK, June 
30, 1997, at 14 (Atlantic ed.), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWEEK File; Charles A. 
Krause, Colonia Dignidad: Nobody Comes, Nobody Goes, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1980, at A1. In 
addition to requiring strict (and apparently forced) religious devotion from his followers, 
Schaefer supposedly “developed close ties to Gen. Manuel Contreras, director of the junta’s 
intelligence service, . . . and allegedly turned his colony over to Contreras to detain leftist pris-
oners.” Hammer, supra, at 14. Though the government repeatedly denied these claims, “[i]n 
1977 a government informant named Juan Muñoz admitted in a church investigation of hu-
man-rights abuses that he had helped ‘disappear’ captives at Colonia Dignidad.” Id. In return 
for his support for Pinochet, Schaeffer allegedly received aid from right wing politicians and 
police as well as a 14-seat Cessna airplane and weapons from the Chilean military. See id. 
 170. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 312-13 n.7. Recently, several scholars have emphasized 
(1) that in the 1960s and 1970s, Pentecostal pastors were much less inclined to discuss social 
issues in their sermons than were other Protestant pastors, see MARTIN, supra note 57, at 237-
38 (presenting the findings of researchers Frederick Turner and LaLive D’Epinay), and (2) the 
difference between Protestant religious organizations’ support of Pinochet and the pro-Allende 
sentiments of most Protestant individuals, noting that individual Protestants had voted for 
Allende while most Protestant (primarily Pentecostal) leaders had opposed Allende and backed 
Pinochet. See id. at 238 (discussing Johannes Tennekes “fundamental conclusion . . . that 
[Pentecostal] pastors held—or struck—much more right-wing attitudes after the coup than 
was consonant with the views of their flocks prior to the coup”); Edward L. Cleary & Juan 
Sepúlveda, Chilean Pentecostalism: Coming of Age, in POWER, POLITICS, AND PENTECOSTALS 
IN LATIN AMERICA 104 (Edward L. Cleary & Hannah W. Stewart-Gambino eds., 1997) 
(summarizing the observations of Renato Poblete, a Jesuit sociologist, regarding Pentecostal 
attitudes toward Allende). Also, at least two commentators have argued that Protestant 
churches’ support for Pinochet “was not principally because of any alleged political affinity but 
rather for reasons relating to religious power.” Id. at 105. 
 171. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 338-39. 
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To bolster its legitimacy and create a counterbalance to the criti-
cisms of the opposition religious groups, the Pinochet government 
actively “courted various Protestant sects”172 and sought to cement 
its support among “friendly” and noncritical churches by granting 
them special privileges and rewards. For example, the government 
“for the first time opened the ranks of the military to non-Catholic 
evangelization and extended social benefits to Protestant ministers 
and their families that had been reserved to Catholic personnel in the 
past.”173 In the early 1970s, the regime also assisted the Methodist 
Pentecostal Church, Chile’s most numerous non-Catholic religious 
group,174 by providing subsidies for the completion of the church’s 
new cathedral, attending the cathedral’s dedication, naming the ca-
thedral as the site of the county’s annual thanksgiving (acción de gra-
cias) services, and asking the cathedral’s pastor to serve as minister of 
religion.175 Similarly, the regime granted the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints (“LDS Church” or “Mormons”)—which gov-
ernment officials publicly praised for its nonpolitical focus176—a sub-
stantial increase in the number of visas given to foreign (primarily 
American) missionaries beginning in the late 1970s177 and presented 
church leaders in 1976 with a special medallion symbolizing the 
church’s contribution to the “social and spiritual welfare of Chile.”178 
 
 172. Telegram October 1975, supra note 149, at 2. 
 173. See Stewart-Gambino, supra note 15, at 27; see also MARTIN, supra note 57, at 242. 
 174. See Stewart-Gambino, supra note 15, at 27. 
 175. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 312-13 n.71 (citation omitted); DAVID STOLL, IS 
LATIN AMERICA TURNING PROTESTANT? 316 (1990) (citing Chile’s Junta Courts the Once-
Spurned Protestants, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 4, 1981, at 59). Though the cathedral’s pas-
tor declined Pinochet’s invitation to serve as minister of religion, he and other evangelical lead-
ers consented to form a “Council of Pastors,” YAÑEZ, supra note 15, at 123 (discussing the 
creation of the “Consejo de Pastores”), that “administer[ed] an official carnet system, to regu-
late the access of pastors to government institutions—the kind of system many evangelicals ac-
cuse communist regimes of using to persecute the church.” STOLL, supra, at 316 (footnote 
omitted). 
 176. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 177. 
 177. Cf. RODOLFO ACEVEDO A., LOS MORMONES EN CHILE 66 (1989) (stating that 
between 1977 and 1979 the LDS Church divided two existing missions to create a total of five 
missions in Chile, producing a need for several hundred additional missionaries). 
 178. ACEVEDO, supra note 177, at 61 n.2 (quoting Gobierno Honró a Mormones, 
REVISTA DEL COBRE, June 26, 1976, at 4) (“bienestar social y espiritual de Chile”). Presenta-
tion of the medallion occurred during a visit of Chilean government representatives to the LDS 
Church’s headquarters. See id. During a public speaking tour throughout Latin America in 
1977, LDS leaders traveled to Santiago and met with General Pinochet and presented him 
with copies of the church’s scriptural works and other LDS literature. See Dell Van Ord, Love, 
Respect and Emotion End Area Conference Series, CHURCH NEWS, Mar. 12, 1977, at 3, 13. 
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The Pinochet regime thus sought to cultivate and maintain good 
relations with those religious groups that supported it—or at least 
did not vocally oppose it—by providing them special privileges. Such 
politically based favoritism violated the government’s constitutional 
duty to foster religious freedom by treating religious groups equally. 
 (3) Conclusion. As the above subsections demonstrate, the Pi-
nochet regime treated religious groups differently according to the 
manner in which it perceived their support for the regime’s policies 
and practices. Those individuals and groups that actively or appar-
ently opposed the government were subjected to varying degrees of 
persecution, while those that actively supported the regime or re-
frained from criticizing it received special privileges. By persecuting 
and favoring individuals and groups because of their religious beliefs, 
the Pinochet regime abrogated its obligation to respect religious lib-
erty. 
c. Popular perception and treatment of religious groups, doctrines, 
and practices. Throughout the Pinochet era, popular perception and 
treatment of religious groups, doctrines, and practices depended 
primarily on political rather than religious factors. Like the military 
government, Chilean society largely based its treatment of different 
religious groups on the manner in which they apparently supported 
or opposed the regime’s policies and actions. Conservative elements 
of society, for example, both criticized the Catholic and historic 
Protestant churches that opposed the regime and engaged in acts of 
terrorism (including bombings, assassinations, death threats, assaults, 
etc.) against individual clergymen who belonged to those relig-
ions.179 Conversely, liberal elements also criticized and engaged in 
 
 179. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 68-69; cf. 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, 
supra note 167, at 420-21 (unidentified parties broke into and/or searched numerous Catho-
lic offices and premises); 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 437 (anonymous 
attacks against property and officials of Catholic Church included attempted assassination of 
two bishops and threats against lay workers); 1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, 
at 457 (Catholic Church attacked by unidentified groups that bombed churches, sprayed 
churches with gunfire, kidnapped and mistreated lay workers, broke into church property and 
files, and threatened church officials or priests); 1984 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 
167, at 446 (“Some [Catholic] church activists and human rights lawyers have occasionally 
been threatened anonymously.”); 1983 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 504 
(“Some [Catholic] Church activists and human rights lawyers were anonymously threatened 
during 1983, but such incidents apparently declined toward the end of 1983.”); 1982 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 158, at 441 (“Some [Catholic] Church activists and human 
rights lawyers have during 1982 been anonymously threatened.”); 1981 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTS, supra note 158, at 376 (“[Catholic] Church activists and human rights lawyers have 
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acts of terrorism against religious groups that actively supported the  
regime or appeared to do so due to their silence about the military’s 
practices and policies.180 
Such ideologically generated perception and treatment of reli-
gious groups had several significant consequences on the develop-
ment of religious liberty. First, it generated and intensified the same 
sort of intradenominational fragmentation that had plagued various 
religions (particularly the Catholic Church) prior to 1973.181 The 
Catholic Church, for example, remained fragmented along liberal, 
moderate, and conservative lines.182 More seriously, the Lutheran 
Church formally split into two churches, one conservative and pro-
military, the other liberal and antimilitary.183 Second, it created in-
terdenominational tensions between religious groups that opposed 
and supported the dictatorship, respectively. As mentioned earlier, 
such tensions caused the dissolution of COPACHI in 1975, as the 
Baptist and Greek Orthodox churches withdrew from the alliance af-
ter several Catholic priests and nuns aided members of a Marxist ter-
rorist group.184 Third, and most important, it created an intolerant 
atmosphere that discouraged the free practice and expression of reli-
gious belief. 
To a much lesser extent, interdenominational tensions also arose 
in response to doctrinally based disputes and the rapid growth of 
 
been anonymously threatened.”); 1980 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 158, at 379 
(“In a number of instances, church property has been the target of attacks carried out by assail-
ants who have not been identified or apprehended.”). 
 180. See William R. Long, Soul Men, L.A. TIMES MAG., June 20, 1993, at 18, 18 (stating 
that between the early 1980s and 1993 leftist terrorists set off approximately “300 explosions 
and fires” at LDS chapels throughout Chile); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 101ST CONG., 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989, at 505 (1990) (“The Mormon 
Church continued to be a target of leftwing terrorist groups . . . ; Mormon churches were 
bombed, but there were no reported injuries.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 101ST CONG., 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1988, at 493 (1989) (“The Mormon 
Church continued to be a target of leftwing terrorist groups.”); 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTS, supra note 167, at 420 (“The Mormon church continued to be a target of leftwing 
terrorist groups, but with fewer bombings than in 1986.); 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, 
supra note 167, at 437 (“[T]here were at least 17 bombings against the Mormon 
Church . . . .”); 1985 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 167, at 457 (“During 1985, 
there were at least fourteen bomb attacks against the Mormon Church, particularly against 
church buildings.”). 
 181. For a discussion of the pre-1973 fragmentation of religions, see supra Part II.A. 
 182. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 68-69. 
 183. See Situación de las Iglesias Evangélicas de Chile, supra note 47, at 107. 
 184. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 318. 
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such non-Catholic groups as the Pentecostals and the Mormons. In 
the mid-1980s, for example, there occurred a “notable cooling of 
relations between Catholics and many Pentecostal churches”185 due 
to the rise and success of “sectarian proselytism” by Pentecostal 
groups.186 Similarly, in the early 1980s, both Catholic officials and 
various Protestant churches expressed their alarm at the rapid growth 
of Mormonism in Chile.187 A group of Protestant pastors even sent a 
letter to President Pinochet, accusing the LDS Church of being non-
Christian and using its economic resources to attract converts.188 
Though not as publicly divisive as ideological differences, such nega-
tive views of other religions contributed to the prevailing atmosphere 
of intolerance. 
3. Conclusion: The development of religious liberty under the Pinochet 
regime 
As demonstrated by the previous discussion of the development 
of Chile’s national juridical framework under Pinochet, the Pinochet 
regime’s perception and treatment of religious groups, and popular 
perceptions and treatment of religious groups, the Pinochet period 
was a contradictory yet significant era in the evolution of religious 
liberty in Chile. On one hand, though the constitutional regime 
regulating religious liberty remained essentially constant, the enact-
ment of national legislation and ratification of international instru-
ments containing provisions relating to specific aspects of religious 
liberty provided religious freedom with unprecedented scope and 
depth. However, Chilean society remained unable to fully enjoy its 
religious rights due to the de facto obstacles and spirit of religious in-
tolerance generated by the military government’s practice of using its 
emergency powers to suspend all nonderogable religious rights and 
the tendency of both the government and public to judge and mis-
treat religious groups according to political ideas and criteria. 
The Pinochet period was thus characterized by contradictory de-
velopments that worked to simultaneously further and restrict reli-
 
 185. Cleary & Sepúlveda, supra note 170, at 113. 
 186. Id. (quoting KATHERINE GILFEATHER O’BRIEN, EL ROL DE ECUMENISMO 
PROTESTANTE COMO POSIBLE SOLUCIÓN AL IMPASSE EN LAS RELACIONES ENTRE LA IGLESIA 
CATÓLICA Y LA COMUNIDAD PENTECOSTAL (1992)). 
 187. See ACEVEDO, supra note 177, at 72. 
 188. See id. (citing Se Desata Polémica Religiosa, LAS ÚLTIMAS NOTICIAS, May 30, 1982, 
at 20). 
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gious freedom. In light of this fact, the true significance of the Pino-
chet era with respect to religious liberty arguably lies in its develop-
ment of a national juridical regime that provided more numerous 
and better defined boundaries outlining the scope of religious lib-
erty. If nothing else, this development would prove to be of much 
value to the continued evolution of religious liberty in post-Pinochet 
Chile. 
B. The Evolution of Religious Liberty in the Post-Pinochet Era: 1990-
2000 
The consolidation of civilian democracy in the post-Pinochet era 
has fostered an important process of normalization in the develop-
ment of religious liberty in Chile. The return of civilian rule elimi-
nated the political tensions responsible for restricting the availability 
and practice of religious freedom during the Pinochet period and 
rendered the government more responsive to the needs of minority 
religions. Moreover, the consolidation of democracy has allowed the 
de jure protections established during the Pinochet regime to ex-
pand, resulting most notably in the recent enactment of legislation 
affirming religious liberty and providing equal juridical standing to 
all religious organizations. Nevertheless, religious liberty has not 
flourished in practice due to government discrimination against cer-
tain religious groups and the growth of interdenominational rivalries 
and related popular prejudices. Religious freedom, therefore, has 
continued to be characterized by contradictory developments that 
have simultaneously strengthened and weakened it. 
1. Background: The consolidation of protected democracy and the post-
Pinochet era 
Since returning to civilian rule in March 1990, Chile has experi-
enced considerable economic and political development and stabil-
ity.189 Though subject to the Constitution of 1980’s restrictive regi-
 
 189. See generally FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 159; LOIS HECHT OPPENHEIM, 
POLITICS IN CHILE: DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND THE SEARCH FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 195-275 (2d ed. 1999). The country’s political stability arguably is perhaps 
best evidenced by the fact that (1) the anti-Pinochet coalition of center-left political parties has 
won all three presidential elections held since 1989, see Clifford Krauss, Chilean Socialist Nar-
rowly Elected to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2000, at A1, and (2) the coalition candi-
date, Ricardo Lagos, who recently won the 1999-2000 presidential election, is a former mem-
ber of the Chilean Socialist Party. See id. 
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men of protected democracy190 and General Pinochet’s continued 
involvement in the national government,191 Chilean democracy has 
achieved a high degree of consolidation “in all sectors of society ex-
cept the military.”192 Endeavors to complete full consolidation have 
failed due to the civilian government’s inability to reduce, if not 
eliminate, the military’s political roles, subject the military to civilian 
control, hold military officials responsible for human rights abuses 
committed under the Pinochet regime, and remove all of the Consti-
tution of 1980’s antidemocratic limitations on civilian democracy.193 
Moreover, such endeavors have generated recurring civil-military 
conflicts.194 Though civil-military relations improved during the mid-
1990s, British authorities’ decision in 1998 to arrest General Pino-
chet while in the United Kingdom for possible extradition to Spain 
to face human rights charges rekindled tensions between the military 
and civilians.195 “Most observers,” however, “[have opined] that only 
hard-line military elements would welcome a coup at this point, and 
that they are unlikely to move on their own.”196 
 
 190. For information on protected democracy and/or the protected democracy-related 
provisions of the Constitution of 1980, see supra notes 71 and 72, respectively. 
 191. Under the Constitution of 1980, see Sigler et al., supra note 76, at 33-34, Pinochet 
served as head of the armed forces until 1998 and has served since then as a senator-for-life. See 
Clifford Krauss, Pinochet, at Home in Chile: A Real Nowhere Man, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, 
at A12. 
 192. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 159. For an intriguing discussion of the tri-
umphs and challenges of consolidation of democracy in Chile, see OPPENHEIM, supra note 
189, at 195-238. 
 193. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 189, at 200-19. 
 194. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 166-68; OPPENHEIM, supra note 189, at 
217-19. 
 195. See, e.g., Joseph Contreras, Awaiting Justice, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1999, at 36 (At-
lantic ed.), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWEEK File; Marc Cooper, Ballots and Bones, 
MOTHER JONES, Mar. 1, 2000, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAGS File; Isabel Hilton, 
As Chilean Television Shows the Verdict, Sonia Weeps with Relief: Someone Finally Is Saying “No” 
to Pinochet, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 27, 1998, at 7, 7-8; Brook Larmer, Undying Memory, 
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1998, at 31 (Atlantic ed.), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWEEK 
File. Though British authorities initially decided to extradite Pinochet to Spain, see Marjorie 
Miller, Pinochet May Be Extradited to Spain to Stand Trial, British Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 1999, at A8, an appellate body ruled in January 2000 against extradition due to Pino-
chet’s poor health. See Marjorie Miller, Britain Says Pinochet Sick, Won’t Be Tried, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2000, at A1. 
 196. FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 159 (footnote omitted). 
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2. Anlaysis: Religious liberty in post-Pinochet Chile 
Chile entered the post-Pinochet era with a relatively well-defined 
juridical regime governing religious freedom, which was limited as a 
matter of de facto reality by governmental and popular attitudes that 
promoted unequal treatment of religious groups and interdenomina-
tional rivalry.197 An analysis of the same three factors examined in 
Part III.A.2—the development of Chile’s national juridical frame-
work, the Chilean government’s perception and treatment of reli-
gious groups, doctrines, and practices, and the popular perception 
and treatment of religious groups, doctrines, and practices—reveals 
that religious liberty has attained an unprecedented level of protec-
tion and acceptance in the post-Pinochet period. The return to and 
consolidation of democracy has allowed Chile to further develop its 
religious liberty-related juridical protections and provisions, while 
diffusing the political tensions responsible for restricting the 
availability and practice of religious freedom during the Pinochet 
period. At the same time, however, religious liberty has struggled 
against several factors promoting de facto religious intolerance, 
particularly the government’s continued practice of granting 
preferential treatment to certain religious groups and the rise of 
popular prejudices stemming from interdenominational rivalries. 
a. Juridical developments relating to freedom of religion. Part 
III.A.2.a demonstrated that upon entering the post-Pinochet period, 
Chile possessed a solid juridical regime that defined the scope of reli-
gious liberty in relation to many areas of the law and society. The 
consolidation of democracy in the post-Pinochet period has rein-
forced these protections by extending them to additional areas of the 
law. 
 (1) Constitutional provisions. The Constitution of 1980 has 
continued to govern Chile since the re-establishment of civilian rule 
in 1990. As a result, the constitutional regime has maintained the 
same guarantees for, and limitations on, religious liberty that existed 
during the last decade of Pinochet’s dictatorship.198 
 (2) Legislative and administrative provisions. As a general rule, 
the post-Pinochet legislative regime has maintained most of the reli-
gious freedom-related provisions enacted by the military govern-
 
 197. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 198. For a brief discussion of the Constitution of 1980’s provisions regarding religious 
liberty, see supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text. 
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ment. In some cases, the existing law was left unaltered;199 in others, 
a new law reproduced the provisions originally enacted by the Pino-
chet regime.200 Chile’s juridical regime has thus continued to recog-
nize such provisions as the illegality of conditioning employment on 
religious belief,201 the inability of community organizations to dis-
criminate against their members on religious grounds,202 the illegality 
of proselyting in community organizations and cooperative socie-
ties,203 the obligation of public schools to teach courses on religion 
and to treat such courses as electives for graduation purposes,204 the 
right of parents of children who attend a private school owned and 
operated by a religious organization to request that their children 
not be educated according to the sponsoring religion’s beliefs,205 the 
right of “religious persons” to receive exemptions from compulsory 
military service,206 and the government’s obligation to provide pris-
oners with religious activities.207 
Under civilian rule, both the national government and local mu-
nicipalities have enacted laws relating to religious freedom. Though 
these laws differ in their potential to affect religious liberty’s contin-
ued development, all further define the scope of protections afforded 
to and by religious liberty by addressing such issues as discussed be-
low. 
   (i) Dissemination of religious belief. Since the early 1990’s, 
numerous municipalities throughout Chile have passed noise ordi-
nances that potentially limit the ability of religious groups to express 
their beliefs in public. In relevant part, the ordinances prohibit the 
use of megaphones to transmit any type of political, commercial, or 
 
 199. See, e.g., Ley No. 18,620, 27 de mayo de 1987, D.O., 6 de julio de 1987; Decreto 
No. 924, 12 de septiembre de 1983, D.O., 7 de enero de 1984. 
 200. Compare, e.g., Ley No. 18,893, 26 de diciembre de 1989, D.O., 30 de diciembre de 
1989, with Ley No. 19,418, 25 de septiembre de 1995, D.O., 9 de octubre de 1995; see also 
Decreto No. 58, 9 de enero de 1997, D.O., 20 de marzo de 1997. 
 201. See Ley No. 18,620, art. 2. 
 202. See Ley No. 19,418, art. 3; see also Decreto No. 58, art. 3. 
 203. See Ley No. 19,418, art. 3; see also Decreto No. 58, art. 3. 
 204. See Decreto No. 76, 7 de mayo de 1985, D.O., 15 de mayo de 1985, art. 2. 
 205. See Decreto No. 924, art. 5. 
 206. See Decreto No. 244, 1 de marzo de 1979, D.O., 3 de mayo de 1979, art. 43(6). 
 207. Compare Decreto-Ley No. 2859, 12 de septiembre de 1979, D.O., 16 de septiem-
bre de 1979, art. 8(2), with Decreto No. 1771, 30 de diciembre de 1992, D.O., 9 de febrero 
de 1993, art. 9(c); see also Decreto No. 518, 22 de mayo de 1998, D.O., 21 de agosto de 
1998, art. 10. 
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religious message without express authorization from the municipal-
ity.208 Some ordinances also forbid the playing of music of any variety 
in public streets without proper authorization from the municipality 
and proscribe the use of amplifiers and production of “any sound 
that disrupts the tranquility, calmness, or rest of a neighborhood, at 
any time of day.”209 Pentecostal groups have protested these ordi-
nances, fearing that they will be enforced to prevent them from en-
gaging in public preaching and musical processions.210 To date, how-
ever, the ordinances have not been enforced in that way.211 
   (ii) Juridical personality of religious organizations. By far 
the most important post-Pinochet development concerning religious 
liberty involved the enactment of legislation that, in addition to reaf-
firming the existing juridical regime and guarantees, granted all reli-
gious organizations equal juridical standing.212 The movement to 
pass such a law began in 1992 with the creation of an Advisory 
Commission for the Organization and Functioning of Pentecostal 
Entities, which was charged in part with determining the type of le-
gal standing that should be granted to Chile’s numerous Pentecostal 
denominations.213 In 1996, President Aylwin’s administration re-
sponded to Pentecostal groups’ “complaints of discrimination” by 
submitting to Congress a bill “providing for legal equality of all 
religions.”214 After passing the House of Deputies, the bill failed in 
the Senate due to pressure from the Catholic Church,215 which 
feared that the bill would “eliminate[] [the Church’s] historic rights 
and expose[] its statutes to the undulations of politics,”216 and 
 
 208. See, e.g., Decreto No. 194, 7 de julio de 1999, D.O., 11 de agosto de 1999, art. 32; 
Decreto No. 650, 10 de junio de 1998, D.O., 21 de julio de 1998, art. 35; Decreto No. 1849, 
30 de octubre de 1997, D.O., 14 de noviembre de 1997, art. 33; Decreto No. 214, 28 de en-
ero de 1993, D.O., 11 de febrero de 1993, art. 36; Decreto No. 431, 5 de junio de 1991, 
D.O., 28 de junio de 1991, art. 2(c). 
 209. Decreto No. 214, art. 36 (“todo sonido que altere la tranquilidad, quietud o reposo 
del vecindario, a cualquier hora del día”). 
 210. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 104TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 1995, at 358 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; see also 
Poblete, supra note 15, at 233-34. 
 211. See Poblete, supra note 15, at 234. 
 212. See Ley No. 19638, 1 de octubre de 1999, D.O., 14 de octubre de 1999. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the law, see infra Part IV.A. Also, see Appendix for the full text of 
the law in Spanish and English. 
 213. See Decreto No. 332, 1 de junio de 1992, D.O., 6 de junio de 1992, art. 2. 
 214. Poblete, supra note 15, at 233. 
 215. See Pedro C. Moreno, Evangelical Churches, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
EVANGELIZATION, supra note 15, at 53. 
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expose[] its statutes to the undulations of politics,”216 and “provide a 
legal base for demands from Evangelical and Protestant faiths to par-
ticipate in official public acts . . . [and] be given positions within 
Chile’s armed services to minister to the needs of their faithful.”217 In 
October 1999, however, the government succeeded in passing the 
law (commonly called the Law of Worship, or ley de cultos),218 over-
coming Catholic objections by altering it so as to “respect[] Catholic 
Church cannon [sic] law.”219 
   (iii) Prisoners’ rights. In addition to reaffirming previous 
provisions requiring penal institutions to provide religious assistance 
and activities,220 two decrees specifically guaranteed inmates’ freedom 
 
 216. Parlamento Aprobó Ley que Establece Igualdad Jurídica de Iglesias, Spanish Newswire 
Services, July 16, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Efenew File [hereinafter Parla-
mento Aprobó] (“eliminaba sus derechos históricos y exponía sus estatutos a los vaivenes de la 
política”). In a more comprehensive discussion regarding the bill, the Catholic Church stated 
that it opposed the bill because: (1) although the Church would retain public legal standing, 
the law granting such standing would remain exposed to future modifications; (2) the bill 
failed to recognize that the Church’s statutes are the product of international agreements be-
tween Chile and the Vatican; (3) the bill failed to address Church canon law, thereby subjugat-
ing canon law to any noncanonical law and complicating the Church’s ministry; (4) under the 
bill, the Church would lose the benefit of 150 years worth of judicial and administrative juris-
prudence; and (5) the bill would permit special judicial proceedings to dissolve a religious or-
ganization. See Puntos de Discordia, LA TERCERA, July 7, 1998 (visited May 19, 2000) 
<http://www.tercera.cl/diario/1998/07/07/2.html>; see also Arzobispo Errázuriz Define 
Postura en la Ley de Culto, LA TERCERA, July 6, 1999 (visited May 11, 2000) 
<http://www.tercera.cl/diario/1999/07/06/06.03.3a.POL.IGLESIA.html>; Reparo de 
Católicos Hacia Ley Cultos, LA TERCERA, July 7, 1998 (visited May 11, 2000) 
<http://www.tercera.cl/diario/1998/07/07/2.html>. 
 217. Current Events Briefs, CHIPS, July 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10738842. Pen-
tecostals, however, believed that the Church’s opposition to the law arose principally from a 
fear of losing political power. See Javier Ortega, Héctor Darío Olivares: “Sabe que Perderá Poder 
Político,” LA TERCERA, Nov. 3, 1997 (visited May 19, 2000) <http://www.tercera.cl/diario/ 
1997/11/03/index.html >. 
 218. See Poblete, supra note 15, at 233. 
 219. See Current Events Briefs, CHIPS, July 10, 1999, available in1999 WL 10738853; 
see also Parlamento Aprobó, supra note 216; Gabriela de la Maza, Las Movidas que Evitaron la 
“Guerra Santa”, LA TERCERA, July 8, 1999 (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.tercera.cl 
/diario/07/08/08.10.3a.CRO.GUERRA.SANTA.html>. Even with the proposed law’s rec-
ognition of canon law, however, some Catholic opposition to the project remained. 
Archbishop Francisco Javier Errázuriz, for example, desired that the new law be amended “so 
that satanic groups and other sects can’t take advantage of [it] . . . .” See Current Events Briefs, 
supra. Similarly, Catholic spokesman Enrique Palet classified the law as “the responsibility of 
the legislators and does not count with the official support of Catholic Church authorities.” 
Current Events Briefs, supra note 217. 
 220. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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of religion.221 The later of the two decrees also stipulated that all 
norms established by that regulation should be applied impartially 
without differentiating between inmates due to religious belief.222 
Together, these laws have added significant breadth and bounda-
ries to Chile’s juridical regime governing religious liberty, particu-
larly with respect to the juridical personality of religious organiza-
tions and the protection of prisoners’ rights. The 1999 Law of 
Worship, however, ranks as the most significant, promising, and po-
tentially far-reaching law that has been enacted to date. At the very 
least, the Law of Worship may be considered the most significant de-
velopment in Chile’s legal regime since the Constitution of 1925 
first guaranteed the freedom of religion and separation of church and 
state. 
 (3) International legal norms. During the first year of civilian 
rule, Chile ratified the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR),223 an international instrument containing several provisions 
that concern religious liberty. In many respects, the pertinent ACHR 
terms closely mirror those established in the ICCPR and ICESCR, 
both of which became binding on Chile under the Pinochet re-
gime.224 All three instruments, for example, prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of religion225 and permit parents to provide for the 
moral and religious education of their children.226 Also, numerous 
other ACHR provisions establish the same rights and freedoms pro-
vided in the ICCPR, including the right to freedom of conscience 
and religion,227 the freedom to maintain and change belief,228 the 
freedom to manifest belief subject to constraints imposed by law,229 
 
 221. See Decreto No. 518, 22 de mayo de 1998, D.O., 21 de agosto de 1998, art. 6; De-
creto No. 1171, 30 de diciembre de 1992, D.O., 9 de febrero de 1993, art. 6. 
 222. See Decreto No. 518 art. 5. 
 223. See Decreto No. 873, 23 de agosto de 1990, D.O., 5 de enero de 1991. 
 224. See supra Part III.A.2.a.(3). 
 225. See American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 
art. 1(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 145 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter ACHR]; 
ICCPR, supra note 96, at 173, art. 2(1). 
 226. See ACHR, supra note 225, at 148, art. 12(4); ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 
18(4); ICESCR, supra note 130, at 8, art. 13(3). 
 227. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 148, art. 12(1), with ICCPR, supra note 96, at 
178, art. 18(1). 
 228. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 148, art. 12(2), with ICCPR, supra note 96, at 
178, art. 18(2). 
 229. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 148, art. 12(3), with ICCPR, supra note 96, at 
178, art. 18(3). 
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the freedom of thought and expression,230 the right of assembly,231  
the freedom of association,232 and prohibitions on governmental abil-
ity to suspend the freedom of religion and conscience, even in emer-
gency situations.233 
Chile’s ratification of the ACHR thus reinforced its commitment 
to honor the religious freedom obligations that it agreed to follow 
upon adopting the ICCPR and the ICESCR during the Pinochet 
era. Accordingly, the country’s international obligations have con-
tinued to form a central element of the national juridical regime gov-
erning the scope of religious freedom. 
 (4) Conclusion: Juridical developments in the post-Pinochet era. 
In addition to achieving a general consolidation of civilian democ-
racy, the post-Pinochet period has affirmed and expanded Chile’s re-
ligious human rights obligations and related juridical regime. Affir-
mation has occurred as existing constitutional guarantees, numerous 
legislative provisions, and national obligations under international 
law have continued to recognize many of the religious liberty-related 
rights and norms established during the Pinochet regime. Expansion 
has taken place as new legislative provisions, including the 1999 Law 
of Worship, have broadened the scope of religious freedom. Though 
recently enacted, the Law of Worship promises to accomplish much 
in Chile’s endeavors to better protect religious human rights. 
b. Government perception and treatment of religious organizations, 
doctrines, and practices. As might be expected, the ideologically 
based repression and favoritism that characterized the Pinochet re-
gime’s perception and treatment of religious groups and beliefs has 
not carried over into the post-Pinochet period. Throughout the 
1990s, therefore, human rights observers have reported that “[a]ll 
denominations practice their faiths without restriction”234 or that 
 
 230. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 148-49, art. 13, with ICCPR, supra note 96, at 
178, art. 19. 
 231. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 149, art. 15, with ICCPR, supra note 96, at 
178, art. 21. 
 232. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 149, art. 16, with ICCPR, supra note 96, at 
178, art. 22. 
 233. Compare ACHR, supra note 225, at 152, art. 27, with ICCPR, supra note 96, at 
174, art. 4. 
 234. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 106TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 1999 (2000) (visited May 20, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global 
/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/chile.html> [hereinafter 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 106TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
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most religious groups have affirmed being free of government inter-
ference in practicing their respective faiths.235 Also, the civilian gov-
ernment’s efforts to consolidate its power has made it responsive to 
minority religious groups’ needs, as evidenced by its efforts to create 
the Advisory Commission for the Organization and Functioning of 
Pentecostal Entities236 and bestow equal juridical standing on all reli-
gious groups.237 
At the same time, however, the government undeniably has 
treated religious groups differently. For example, the United States 
State Department has affirmed consistently since 1995 (unfortu-
nately, without providing much proof) that the “the Catholic 
Church enjoys a privileged position among religions”238 and “re-
ceives preferential official treatment.”239 Chile’s Protestant popula-
tion recently complained about the Catholic Church’s privileged po-
sition and charged the government with engaging in discriminatory 
 
PRACTICES FOR 1998, at 540 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, 105TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 
1997, at 447 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
105TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996, at 385 (1997) 
[hereinafter 1996 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 
210, at 358; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 104TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 1994, at 346 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, 103D CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 
1993,  at 388 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
103D CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992,  at 356 (1993) 
[hereinafter 1992 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 102D CONG., COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991,  at 529 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS]. 
 235. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 102D CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 1990, at 542 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTS]. 
 236. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 238. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 106TH CONG., ANN. REP. ON INT’L FREEDOM FOR 1999: 
CHILE (Comm. Print 1999) (visited May 23, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global 
/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_chile99.html> [hereinafter 1999 INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT]. 
 239. Id.; see also 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234; 1998 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTS, supra note 234, at 540; 1997 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 447; 
1996 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 385; 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, 
supra note 210, at 358. The State Department’s general statements appear to be supported by 
the fact that in 1998 the Chilean government contributed more than $3 million (USD) to the 
Catholic Church to cover costs incurred by a Church-sponsored conference attended by 
500,000 youth from the Western Hemisphere. See 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238. 
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conduct in multiple ways. As the State Department reported in 
1999, 
[t]he country’s Protestants assert that the Government discrimi-
nates against them, based upon differing legal status afforded to 
non-Catholics. They cite the absence of Protestant armed forces 
chaplains (all chaplains are Catholic), difficulties for pastors to visit 
military hospitals, and the predominantly Catholic religious educa-
tion in public schools. Military recruits, whatever their religion, of-
ten have to attend Catholic events involving their unit, and being a 
Catholic is considered beneficial to one’s military career.240 
With respect to Protestant claims of discrimination in attaining 
legal personality, it is interesting to note that during the early and 
mid-1990s the Ministry of Justice denied at least two Pentecostal 
groups’ petitions for legal personality because the groups allegedly 
were religious sects whose “practices seriously violate human dig-
nity.”241 Soon thereafter, however, the Ministry reversed its decision 
with respect to one of the groups due to pressure from numerous 
Pentecostal churches and organizations.242 The Ministry’s reversal 
suggests that its original decision rested on grounds of an arbitrary, if 
not discriminatory, nature.243 
Since 1997, numerous other incidents have occurred that raise 
questions about the government’s support of religious liberty, par-
ticularly with respect to religious minorities and smaller religious 
groups. For example, the United States State Department reported 
in January 1997 that Chile’s “small Jewish population is free to prac-
tice its religion but faces some discrimination in public life.”244 This 
comment referred to a series of incidents during which a cabinet 
minister and subcabinet member made anti-Semitic remarks.245 
Though neither official took discriminatory action against any Jewish  
 
 
 240. 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238. 
 241. Decreto No. 528, 29 de mayo de 1995, D.O., 4 de junio de 1995, preamble (“sus 
prácticas violenta gravamente la dignidad humana”); see also Decreto No. 1126, 10 de 
noviembre de 1995, D.O., 9 de enero de 1996 (noting that the Universal Church of the 
Kingdom of God’s original petition had been denied). 
 242. See Decreto No. 1126, preamble. 
 243. But see 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238 
(“Government refusal to register a religious group . . . is rare . . . .”). 
 244. 1996 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 385. 
 245. See id. 
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organizations, their comments fostered a severe feeling of intolerance 
that affected the entire Jewish community.246 
Similarly, in late 1997, the Ministry of the Interior refused to re-
new the visas of seven Brazilian pastors belonging to the Universal 
Church of the Kingdom of God, stating suspicions that the group’s 
followers might be forced to make donations.247 The Brazilian pas-
tors’ attorneys accused the government of acting arbitrarily and fail-
ing to respect religious freedom, arguing that the pastors did not 
violate Chile’s immigration laws prohibiting persons possessing a 
tourist visa from participating in “activities with remuneration,” even 
though the pastors subsisted on donations made by church mem-
bers.248 The pastors lost their appeal to the local courts and were or-
dered to leave the country.249 
Likewise, the Chilean government expelled a Hindu religious 
leader in 1998 for committing a crime against the country’s “morals 
and good customs.”250 Media reports alleged that the expulsion 
 
 246. I was in Santiago shortly after these events occurred as part of a research project 
concerning the history of Chile’s Jewish community and noticed the high degree of agitation 
and uncertainty created within the Jewish community by the government officials’ comments. 
Indeed, members of the Jewish community, and even of the community’s principal organiza-
tions, remained so fearful of opening up to “outsiders” that they declined to assist me with my 
research. 
  In February 1999, a similar problem arose when the government named as Vice 
Minister of the Interior an individual who allegedly made an anti-Semitic remark while serving 
as Vice Minister of Public Works in 1996. See 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
REPORT, supra note 238. The official denied the accusation, stating that his comments “had 
been purely political.” Id. Unlike the 1997 incident, the situation with the Vice Minister re-
solved itself peacefully after Jewish representatives accepted his declarations “that he was not an 
anti-Semite.” Id. 
 247. See Apelan Lideres de Secta Religiosa por Negativa de Visa, NOTIMEX, Nov. 10, 
1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Notcia File [hereinafter Apelan Lideres]. The same 
charges had been made against the group’s founder in Brazil. See id. 
 248. Claudio Centro T., Abogado Fidel Reyes: “No se Respeta la Libertad de Cultos”, LA 
TERCERA, Mar. 18, 1998 (copy on file with author) (“ejercer actividades con remuneración”); 
cf. Apelan Lideres, supra note 247 (quoting attorney Pedro Canihuete’s statement that the 
church has been persecuted since its establishment). Catholic church leaders declined to com-
ment extensively on the situation, saying only that “[t]he Brazilians’ problem is not of freedom 
of worship, which is guaranteed in the Constitution, but of administrative reasons adopted by 
the authority.” Iglesia Católica: “No nos Opinar”, LA TERCERA, Mar. 18, 1998 (copy on file 
with author) (“El problema de los brasileños no es de libertad de culto, el cual está garantizado 
en la Constitución, sino de razones administrativas adoptadas por la autoridad.”). 
 249. See Ordena Gobierno Chileno Explusión Contra Misioneros Brasileños, NOTIMEX 
(Feb. 19, 1998), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Notcia File. 
 250. Guru Hace su Show, EL NORTE, Sep. 7, 1998, at 9, available at1998 WL 13029661 
(“la moral y las buenas costumbres”). 
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stemmed from the guru’s “scandalous sex life”—in accordance with 
his religious beliefs, the guru had six wives.251 
Moreover, in October 1999, a medical clinic in Antofagasta ob-
tained a court order “to provide a blood transfusion to a critically ill” 
Jehovah’s Witness, even though the patient had “brought papers 
with her [to the clinic] testifying to the fact that she didn’t want 
blood transfusions because she is a Jehovah’s Witness.”252 The clinic 
noted that it had obtained similar assistance from the courts on four 
other occasions.253 
Finally, throughout the late 1990s, the Chilean government has 
carried out at least eight police raids on Colonia Dignidad, 254 a reli-
gious colony that was stripped of its legal status in 1991 for alleged 
financial crimes255 and has been accused of having served in part as a 
detention and torture center during the Pinochet period.256 In addi-
tion to attempting to arrest the group’s presently fugitive leader on 
sexual abuse charges,257 police searched the commune’s facilities for 
weapons, explosives, and drugs.258 Members of the colony de-
nounced the government’s actions, believing that the government’s 
“ultimate goal” is to “split up or liquidate[]”259 the group. “We have 
nothing to hide. They say we are a sect of fanatically religious people, 
but that is wrong. All our people are Christians, . . . but our main 
aim is to create a spirit of family in the community.”260 
Thus, despite the fact that the politically based repression and fa-
voritism that characterized the Pinochet regime’s perception and 
 
 251. Id. (“escandalosa vida sexual”). The media’s speculations apparently also resulted 
from the fact that after being expelled from Chile, guru Badani hosted a television program in 
Peru about eroticism. See id. 
 252. Current News Briefs, CHIPS, Oct. 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10739144. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See Hugh Davies, German Settlers Under Siege in Chile: Are they Nazi Brainwashers 
and Child Abusers, or Guardians of Family Values?, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 9, 1997, at 18, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Telegr File. For a brief discussion of claims regarding Colo-
nia Dignidad’s involvement with the Pinochet regime, see supra note 169. 
 255. See Chile: Decision to Dissolve Secret German Colony Ratified, Inter Press Service, 
June 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File (stating that President Patricio 
Aylwin revoked Colonia Dignidad’s legal status for “charges of tax evasion, violation of non-
profit status and other financial aberrations”). 
 256. See supra note 173. 
 257. See Hammer, supra note 169, at 14. 
 258. See Davies, supra note 254, at 18. 
 259. Id. (quoting Dr. Harmutt Hopp). 
 260. Id. (quoting Wolfgang Muller). 
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treatment of religious groups and beliefs has not carried over into 
the post-Pinochet period and that the civilian government has made 
efforts to respond to minority religious groups’ needs, an element of 
preferential treatment and discrimination in the government’s treat-
ment of religious groups has continued to exist. Though govern-
ment acts of discriminatory treatment have not risen to the level of 
persecution, they nevertheless have fostered, at the very least, an at-
mosphere of religious intolerance that hinders the growth of reli-
gious liberty.261 
c. Popular perception and treatment of religious organizations, 
doctrines, and practices. Popular perceptions and treatment of reli-
gious organizations, doctrines, and practices have influenced the de-
velopment of religious freedom in several ways during the post-
Pinochet era. First, in the early 1990s, lingering ideological percep-
tions identifying the LDS Church as either a supporter of the Pino-
chet regime or agent of United States imperialism prompted leftist 
guerrilla groups to continue their attacks on, and bombings of, LDS 
chapels throughout Chile.262 Though these actions remained politi-
cally motivated and did not formally affect the church’s ability to ex-
ercise its right to freely assemble and manifest its beliefs,263 they  
 
 
 261. Developments in Chile’s last two presidential elections provide perhaps the best evi-
dence of this atmosphere of intolerance and suspicion. In 1993, presidential candidate Edu-
ardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle confronted rumors that he, if elected, would oppress Pentecostal 
churches. See Benigno Ramos, Frei Desmintió Persecución a Iglesias Evangélicas, LA TERCERA, 
Nov. 8, 1993, at 10, available in DIALOG, Info-South File. Similarly, in 1999, presidential 
candidate Ricardo Lagos disputed rumors that, if elected, he would prohibit Pentecostals from 
preaching publicly. See J.A.Q., Lagos Desmiente Rumores a Evangélicos, LA TERCERA, Apr. 22, 
1999 (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.tercera.cl/diario/1999/04/22/22.04.3a. 
POL.LAGOS.html>. 
 262. See 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 390 (reporting 15 bomb-
ings of LDS chapels and two instances of confrontations between terrorists and worshippers); 
1992 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 356 (“The Mormon Church continued to 
be a target of leftwing terrorist groups . . . , apparently for political rather than religious rea-
sons.”); 1991 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 525 (reporting “more than 30 
[politically motivated] bombings of Mormon churches”); 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, 
supra note 235, at 537, 542 (reporting more than 53 politically motivated acts of terrorism by 
leftist guerrillas, including bombings of LDS chapels, and one politically-motivated physical 
attack on a missionary from the United States). 
 263. As an LDS missionary in Santiago between 1991 and 1993, I witnessed the 
Church’s response to such acts of terrorism. Though fixing the damaged buildings inconven-
ienced members and cost the Church a good deal of money, the bombings never prevented 
local congregations from holding their normal worship services and failed to influence the 
Church to ever even consider dissolving its local congregations or modifying its local activities. 
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nonetheless added an element of religious intolerance to Chilean so-
ciety. 
Second, although Chileans “generally are tolerant of religious 
differences, . . . some discrimination occurs” that favors the Catholic 
Church.264 For example, “[n]on-Catholic clergymen sometimes have 
difficulties gaining access to prisons and public hospitals” where ad-
mittance “is at the discretion of administrators.”265 Unlike their non-
Catholic counterparts, however, “Catholic priests usually do not face 
such difficulties.”266 
Third, popular stereotypes of religious groups have established 
widespread notions of the inferiority of certain (generally non-
Catholic) churches and their followers. In 1997, for example, Juan 
Alberty Rabat, a representative of the Committee of Evangelical Or-
ganizations, stated that “[t]he marginalization [of Pentecostals] is a 
concrete fact. For a long time[,] Pentecostals belonged to the lowest 
sectors of the population[,] and prejudice is born from that: we are 
considered second category persons. People forget the tremendous 
contribution that our church has made to the country.”267 Proof of 
such prejudice and marginalization, Rabat asserted, lays in the fact 
that people are surprised to learn that “successful” people (like him-
self) belong to the religion.268 
Fourth, popular religious-based prejudices have increased during 
the past decade in response to intensifying interdenominational rival-
ries and tensions arising from the success of non-Catholic missionary 
endeavors among Catholics.269 The rise of such popular prejudices 
generally has coincided with religious groups’ increasingly antagonis-
tic confrontations with, and attitudes toward, one another. In 1999, 
for example, various Pentecostal groups opposed the enactment of 
the Law of Worship because it provided equal juridical status and re-
 
 264. 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Patricia Schüller, “Somos Considerados Personas de Segunda Categoría”, LA TERCERA, 
May 31, 1997, (copy on file with author) (“La marginación hacia nosotros es un hecho con-
creto. Durante mucho tiempo los evangélicos pertenecieron a los sectores más bajos de la po-
blación y de allí nace el prejuicio: somos considerados personas de segunda categoría. La gente 
se olvida del tremendo aporte que ha hecho al país nuestra iglesia.”). 
 268. See id. 
 269. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 177-79; see also Edward L. Cleary, The 
Catholic Church, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EVANGELIZATION, supra note 15, at 24-25; 
Moreno, supra note 215, at 56. 
THU-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:36 PM 
1185] Religious Liberty in Chile 
 1243 
ligious rights to the LDS Church and Jehovah’s Witnesses.270 Simi-
larly, Catholic officials disapproved of the law in part because it ap-
parently extended its benefits and protections to “satanic groups and 
other sects.”271 Also, negative discussions in the national press about 
the allegedly violent and illegal activities of small religious groups 
operating in Chile have resulted in calls for legislation banning such 
“religious sects.”272 
Most importantly, since 1999, the Catholic Church’s relations 
with non-Catholic groups have been strained due to the Church’s 
increasingly combative attitude toward non-Catholic proselytizing 
activities.273 In addition to promoting “active competition” with 
non-Catholic groups,274 the Catholic hierarchy has harshly criticized 
non-Catholic groups, especially the LDS Church.275 Not surprisingly, 
many non-Catholic groups have reciprocated similar harsh feelings 
and opinions about Catholicism and its perceived flaws and dan-
gers.276 
Though human rights observers to date have not identified these 
and other similar progressively antagonistic interdenominational atti-
tudes as obstacles to religious freedom in Chile,277 it is indisputable 
 
 270. See Protecting the Right to Convert, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 1, 1999, at 28, 28. 
 271. See Current Events Briefs, supra note 219. 
 272. See Enrique Mujica, Ante Hechos Conflictivos: Piden Leyes Contra Sectas Religiosas 
que Operan en el Pais, EL MERCURIO, Sep. 16, 1992, at 1A, available in DIALOG, Info-
South File (discussing endeavors to legislate against religious cults in Chile and noting such 
cult practices as kidnapping minors and sending them abroad, arms trafficking, and compelling 
cult followers to participate in sexual activities with each other). 
 273. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 177-79. 
 274. Id. at 178. 
 275. See id. at 177. Professors Fleet and Smith further noted that 
[in an official pastoral publication, the Catholic bishops] were particularly critical of 
the [Mormons], whom they saw as posing a danger for democratic society because 
of their “doctrinal demagoguery,” their “theocratic, vertical and totalitarian struc-
tures,” their insistence on possessing the “absolute truth,” their control of informa-
tion, their “total rejection of society and its institutions,” their “suppression of indi-
vidual liberties” of their adherents, their insistence that new members “break all 
former social ties upon entrance into the cult,” and their attitude that “all those out-
side the group” were enemies. 
Id. (quoting CONFERENCIA EPISCOPAL DE CHILE, EVANGÉLICOS Y SECTAS: PROPUESTAS 
PASTORALES 28 (1992)). 
 276. See Moreno, supra note 215, at 57-58. 
 277. See, e.g, 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238; 
1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234; 1998 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 
234, at 540; 1997 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 447; 1996 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTS, supra note 234, at 385; 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 210, at 358; 
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that they have resulted in “some discrimination” against religious 
organizations and their followers.278 Further development of such 
sentiments could pose a serious problem. Not only would such atti-
tudes likely restrict individuals’ and religious groups’ abilities to 
freely exercise their religious human rights but they could also dis-
courage different religious groups’ ability and willingness to work 
together for the benefit of Chilean society. 
Even as the situation currently stands, however, popular preju-
dices have engendered instances of religious-based discrimination. In 
mid-1999, for example, parents of fourteen students expelled by a 
small private school in Santiago for alleged behavioral problems and 
involvement with illegal drugs claimed that the students’ expulsion 
resulted from religious discrimination.279 Specifically, the parents 
claimed that the school discriminated against the children because 
they belonged to “the strict Casa del Señor . . . sect” (a “fundamen-
talist religious group that originated in the United States”) and had 
“distanced themselves from normal school goings on.”280 
Thus, though politically motivated persecution influenced popu-
lar treatment of religious groups in the early 1990s, interdenomina-
tional rivalry and prejudices have become the most powerful factors 
affecting popular perceptions and treatment of religious groups in 
the post-Pinochet era. Such prejudices have not yet noticeably af-
fected the development of religious liberty on a widespread basis, but 
their current mode and rate of evolution suggests that they could 
easily become a significant obstacle to de facto religious freedom. 
d. Conclusion: The development of religious liberty in the post-
Pinochet era. As demonstrated by the above analysis of (1) the devel-
opment of Chile’s national juridical framework; (2) the civilian gov-
ernment’s perception and treatment of religious groups, beliefs, and 
practices; and (3) popular perceptions and treatment of religious 
groups, doctrines, and practices, the development of religious liberty 
in the post-Pinochet era has generally paralleled the course it fol-
lowed during the Pinochet period. On one hand, the national juridi-
cal regime has continued to define the scope of de jure protection 
 
1994 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 234, at 346; 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, 
supra note 234, at 388; 1992 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 235; 1991 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 235; 1990 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 235. 
 278. 1999 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 238. 
 279. See Current Events Briefs, CHIPS, July 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10738804. 
 280. Id. 
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provided to and by religious liberty. Similarly, on the other hand, 
both the government’s unequal treatment of different religious 
groups and popular perception and treatment of religious groups 
have continued to obstruct de facto religious liberty, despite the fact 
that the government and public have acted according to different 
motivations and in different ways than during the Pinochet period. 
The post-Pinochet development of religious liberty, therefore, has 
continued to be characterized by contradictory developments that 
have worked to simultaneously further and restrict religious freedom. 
At the same time, however, the post-Pinochet period has ex-
panded de jure protection of religious freedom to an unprecedented 
level, especially through the enactment of the 1999 Law of Worship. 
For reasons explained in Part IV.A, the Law of Worship constitutes 
the most significant achievement in the development of religious lib-
erty since the Pinochet regime’s adoption of the ICCPR, and argua-
bly since the Constitution of 1925 first guaranteed the freedom of 
religion and separation of church and state. 
C. Conclusion: The Development of Religious Liberty in Chile During 
the Pinochet and Post-Pinochet Periods 
The saga of religious liberty in Chile has traveled an interesting 
and unique path since 1973. Despite being guaranteed as a matter of 
constitutional law since 1925, it was only during the past twenty-five 
years, from the Pinochet period on, that religious liberty began to 
take on more definite characteristics and juridical applications. 
During the Pinochet regime, religious freedom’s most significant 
advances occurred with the Pinochet government’s acceptance of the 
ICCPR, which obliged Chile to apply religious freedom principles to 
circumstances not addressed in Chilean national law. These juridical 
gains, however, failed to make a noticeable impact on Chilean society 
due to the politically motivated repression of religious groups and 
clergy by both the Pinochet regime and the public at large. 
In the post-Pinochet period, the development of Chile’s juridical 
system has continued to extend religious liberty guarantees and 
rights to new heights, particularly through the recent enactment of 
the 1999 Law of Worship that established the legal equality of all re-
ligious organizations. These juridically-based gains, however, have 
been undermined by the government’s continued practice of dis-
criminating against religious organizations, especially minority  
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groups, and the evolution of increasingly antagonistic interdenomi-
national rivalries. 
Compared against one another, the religious liberty-related de-
velopments that occurred in the Pinochet and post-Pinochet period 
reveal several important facts about the evolution and current status 
of religious freedom in Chile. First, as demonstrated by the previous 
discussions on government and popular perceptions and treatment of 
religious beliefs and groups, the national security policies and con-
cerns that heavily influenced the exercise of religious freedom under 
the Pinochet regime did not carry over to the post-Pinochet period. 
While political ideology played a small role in promoting persecution 
of the LDS Church in the early 1990s, interdenominational tensions 
and rivalries have replaced politics as the primary factor affecting the 
popular perception and treatment of religious groups. Moreover, the 
civilian government’s attempts to consolidate democracy have in-
duced it to eschew purely political confrontations and to be some-
what more responsive to the needs of minority religions. 
Second, though the Pinochet regime added several notable pro-
visions to Chile’s national juridical framework defining the scope of 
religious freedom, the consolidation of democracy in the post-
Pinochet period has greatly strengthened the country’s commitment 
to protecting freedom of religion. Also, the Law of Worship has ex-
tended juridical protection of religious freedom to new areas of the 
law and society and potentially gives the Chilean State a greater ca-
pacity to legally ensure that all religions enjoy the right to freely ex-
ercise their respective beliefs. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN CHILE: POTENTIAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS 
In light of the development of religious liberty in Chile to date, 
it appears that Chile currently stands at a crossroads with respect to 
the evolution of religious liberty. On one hand, the 1999 Law of 
Worship promises a new and exciting era in the continued develop-
ment and practice of religious freedom. On the other hand, govern-
ment and popular pressures that restrict the full enjoyment of reli-
gious rights threaten to potentially hamper the rights and privileges 
enshrined in the Law of Worship from reaching their full potential. 
The situation thus begs the question: what course(s) will reli-
gious liberty follow in the near future in Chile? Will the Law of Wor-
ship strengthen Chile’s de jure obligations to religious freedom to 
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the degree of overpowering, or at least overshadowing, those forces 
that impose de facto limits on society’s ability to freely exercise reli-
gious belief? Will such factors as government favoritism, popular re-
ligion-based prejudices, and interdenominational rivalry advance de 
facto religious intolerance so as to render the Law of Worship insig-
nificant? Or will religious liberty merely continue upon the course it 
has followed since 1925, undulating in the tension generated by 
competing de jure and de facto influences? 
Though the answer to these and other similar questions presently 
remains unascertainable, three particular factors possess the potential 
to influence the course of religious freedom in Chile’s near future: 
the Law of Worship, ecumenism, and the increasing participation of 
Protestant groups in Chilean socio-political matters. Each, however, 
could affect the development of religious freedom in various unique 
ways. 
A. The 1999 Law of Worship and Chile’s De Jure Commitment to 
Religious Freedom 
A close examination of the Law of Worship (“the Law”) indi-
cates that it merits its classification as “an historic victory” 281 in the 
quest to “reaffirm the freedom of worship”282 and “help guarantee 
that all faiths and creeds are given equal treatment by the state of 
Chile.”283 The Law accomplishes these two objectives by (1) con-
solidating and synthesizing the various constitutional, legislative, and 
international legal provisions that Chile has adopted since the com-
mencement of the Pinochet period; (2) adding several significant 
provisions not previously incorporated into Chile’s juridical regime; 
and (3) orchestrating the processes by which religious organizations 
are formed and dissolved in such a way that removes much of the po-
tential for arbitrariness and discrimination on the part of government 
officials. The law thus marks a significant juridical advance in the 
evolution of Chile’s de jure commitment to religious freedom and 
could potentially reduce, if not eliminate, the Chilean government’s 
capacity to act in ways that place de facto restrictions on religious lib-
erty. At the same time, however, structural defects within the Law  
 
 
 281. Current Events Briefs, supra note 217. 
 282. Parlamento Aprobó, supra note 216. 
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could just as easily continue many arbitrary and discriminatory gov-
ernment practices. 
1. The Law of Worship’s primary provisions 
The Law of Worship is divided into five chapters covering: (1) 
general rules relating to religious freedom; (2) specific norms 
governing the freedom of religion and worship; (3) procedural rules 
regulating the attainment of public legal standing as a religious or-
ganization; (4) assets and tax exemptions; and (5) procedural rules 
directing the dissolution of religious organizations. Following is a 
brief examination of these chapters’ main provisions.284  
a. General norms. The first chapter of the Law affirms three cen-
tral elements of Chile’s juridical regime relating to religious freedom. 
Specifically, the Law (1) requires the national government to guaran-
tee the freedom of religion as set forth in the Constitution, (2) pro-
scribes discrimination on the basis of religious belief, and (3) obli-
gates the national government to guarantee the free exercise of 
religious belief by both individuals and religious groups.285 
b. Freedom of religion and worship. This chapter accomplishes two 
functions. First, it consolidates the primary religious liberty-related 
norms that have become part of Chile’s juridical regime during the 
past twenty-five years, including (1) the freedom of conscience and 
belief;286 (2) the right to freely exercise religious belief;287 (3) the 
freedom of expression;288 (4) the right of parents to control their 
child’s religious education;289 and (5) the freedom of assembly.290 
Second, the chapter adds two new religious rights to Chile’s juridical 
regime: (1) an individual’s right to religious assistance from his or 
her own religion, subject to any limitations of access imposed by the 
 
 284.  For the complete text of the Law in both Spanish and English, see Appendix. 
 285. See Ley No. 19,638, 1 de octubre de 1999, D.O., 14 de octubre de 1999, arts. 1-3. 
 286. Compare id. art. 6(a), with CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 19, no. 6, 
and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 18(1)-(2). 
 287. Compare Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(a)-(b), with CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) 
art. 19, no. 6, and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 18(3). 
 288. Compare Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(d), with CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 
19, no. 6, and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 19(2). 
 289. Compare Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(d), with Decreto No. 924, 12 de septiembre de 
1983, D.O., 7 de enero de 1984, and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 18(4). 
 290. Compare Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(e), with CHILE CONST. (Constitution of 1980) art. 
19, no. 13, and ICCPR, supra note 96, at 178, art. 22(1)-(2). 
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responsible government ministry291 and (2) the right of religious or-
ganizations to exercise absolute autonomy over their internal organi-
zation and selection and training of clergy.292 
c. Public legal standing. The most significant provision set forth 
in this chapter involves the granting of public legal personality to all 
religious organizations that complete the pertinent procedural re-
quirements.293 With respect to those requirements, the most signifi-
cant (1) allow the formation of religious legal persons as nonprofit 
corporations, foundations, and associations; (2) require prospective 
religious organizations to register with the Ministry of Justice; and 
(3) prohibit the Ministry of Justice from denying a petition for legal 
standing, with the exception that petitions may be rejected if they 
contain errors or lack required information.294 
d. Assets and tax exemptions. Closely paralleling norms estab-
lished by the juridical regime during the Pinochet era,295 this chapter 
(1) allows religious organizations to purchase, sell, and administer all 
forms of property; (2) permits religious entities to solicit and receive 
donations and tithes from their members and public and private in-
stitutions; (3) exempts from taxation those donations given to reli-
gious organizations with legal standing; (4) grants all religious enti-
ties the same rights, exemptions, and tax benefits; and (5) allows 
religious juridical persons formed under the Law to regularize their 
ownership of property registered publicly or in the name of natural 
or juridical persons.296 Of necessity, this chapter treats tax exemp-
tions in a much more general manner than does the existing juridical 
regime.297 
e. Dissolution. Making a fundamental change from previous laws 
governing the dissolution of religious organizations,298 this chapter 
abolishes the government’s ability to dissolve religious entities via an 
administrative decree. The new procedure requires dissolution to oc-
cur (1) in accordance with a religious juridical person’s statutes of in-
corporation or (2) through a complaint filed in court by the Council 
 
 291. See Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(c). 
 292. See id. art. 7. 
 293. See id. art. 9. 
 294. See id. arts. 10-13. 
 295. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text. 
 296. See Ley No. 19,638 arts. 15-18. 
 297. Compare id. with notes 123-126 and accompanying text 
 298. See, e.g., Decreto No. 110, 17 de enero de 1979, D.O., 20 de marzo de 1979. 
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for the Defense of the State (CDE), the agency charged with defend-
ing the State’s legal interests in the national courts.299 
2. The 1999 Law of Worship and Chile’s juridical regime 
The above sketch of the Law’s provisions reveals that the Law 
adds several noteworthy norms to Chile’s juridical framework gov-
erning religious liberty. For example, the Law (1) establishes an indi-
vidual’s right to receive religious assistance from his or her own reli-
gious group, subject to any limitations of access to public institutions 
imposed by the responsible government ministry;300 (2) guarantees 
religious organizations’ right to exercise absolute autonomy over 
their internal organization and selection and training of clergy;301 (3) 
recognizes an individual’s right to receive a proper burial, without 
religious discrimination;302 (4) grants public legal personality to all 
incorporated religious organizations;303 (5) prohibits the Ministry of 
Justice from denying religious organizations’ petitions for legal 
standing unless flawed by errors or missing information;304 and (6) 
outlines new requirements and procedures for dissolving religious 
organizations.305 
3. The 1999 Law of Worship and the future development of religious 
liberty in Chile 
In light of the above discussions about the Law of Worship’s 
primary provisions and relation to Chile’s existing juridical regime, it 
remains apparent that the Law completes its principal objectives of 
“reaffirm[ing] the freedom of worship”306 and “help[ing] guarantee 
that all faiths and creeds are given equal treatment by the state of 
Chile”307 in several ways. First, the Law reaffirms the spectrum of 
rights and guarantees previously associated with religious liberty by 
synthesizing many of them into its provisions and treating them 
 
 299. See Ley No. 19,638 art. 19. 
 300. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 302. See Ley No. 19,638 art. 6(b). 
 303. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 304. See Ley No. 19,638 art. 11. 
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 306. Parlamento Aprobó, supra note 216. 
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comprehensively. Second, the Law also reaffirms the freedom of re-
ligion by identifying additional rights that fall within religious lib-
erty’s scope. Third, the Law helps guarantee the equal treatment of 
religious organizations by the State by granting religious entities 
equal juridical standing and altering the processes of incorporation 
and dissolution. Rather than placing decision-making authority in 
administrative officials, the Law requires the approbation of incorpo-
ration once a religious organization’s petition includes the pertinent, 
correct information. Also, the Law removes the dissolution process 
from the potentially arbitrary administrative agencies and vests it in 
the courts. 
The 1999 Law of Worship thus attempts to provide Chile with a 
fresh, condensed view and understanding of religious liberty in a way 
that reaffirms the country’s de jure guarantees and obligations and 
lessens the possibility of government discrimination and partiality. 
Despite these efforts, however, the Law fails to fully remove the po-
tential for unequal treatment and discrimination for several reasons. 
First, though the Law affirms general principles of religious liberty 
and appears to encompass both organized and unorganized religious 
groups, the Law’s focus on such matters as autonomy over ecclesias-
tical affairs, juridical personality, assets, and dissolution seems to ca-
ter specially to organized, incorporated religious groups. The ab-
sence of similar guarantees for nonincorporated or nontraditional 
religious groups at the very least demonstrates a potential bias 
against such groups in Chile’s legislative and juridical system. More-
over, it seems to favor traditional, organized groups’ interests in a 
manner that discriminates against nontraditional, nonincorporated 
groups. 
Second, by requiring the State to guarantee freedom of religion 
according to the terms set forth in the Constitution, the Law sub-
jects religious freedom to the amorphous requirement that the main-
tenance or manifestation of religious belief not oppose “morals, 
good customs or public order.”308 By reaffirming such a vague limit 
and failing to delineate its scope or meaning, the Law essentially 
grants the Chilean government, and ultimately the judiciary, an un-
regulated capacity to interpret which religious beliefs and practices 
violate the constitutional regime. 
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Third, in its provisions regarding dissolution, the Law fails both 
to recognize a cause of action that the CDE must assert to initiate 
dissolution proceedings and to establish the legal standard for the 
courts to employ in determining whether a religious organization 
should be dissolved. By failing to include these elements and leaving 
them to potentially be determined by future legislation, the Law ex-
poses its dissolution provisions to the ever-unpredictable forces of 
politics. Furthermore, the Law risks the possibility that the courts 
will adopt as their decision-making standard—or even the CDE’s 
cause of action—the malleable constitutional “not opposed to mor-
als, good customs or public order” language.309 
Therefore, the precise effect that the Law of Worship will have 
on the future development of religious liberty in Chile remains un-
certain. Though the Law contains many provisions that strengthen 
Chile’s de jure commitment to, and protection of, freedom of relig-
ion in a manner that potentially lessens the importance of govern-
ment practices on de facto religious liberty, its failure to fully and 
adequately define the juridical limitations on religious liberty may 
weaken the de jure regime, or at least allow government discrimina-
tion and partiality to continue to exert great influence on de facto re-
ligious liberty. Consequently, the Law’s ultimate impact on the fu-
ture of religious liberty may depend on future legislative acts or the 
manner in which the courts interpret it. 
B. Ecumenism, Protestants and Politics, and De Facto Religious 
Tolerance/Intolerance 
1. The impotency of ecumenism 
Since the early 1990s, interdenominational rivalry and related 
popular prejudices concerning religious groups have emerged as two 
of the major sources of de facto religious intolerance in post-Pinochet 
Chile.310 In a society with many diverse religious groups and beliefs, 
it may be that, at least to some degree, interdenominational rivalry 
constitutes an inescapable element of reality. However, from a theo-
retical standpoint, ecumenism, an inclination or movement seeking 
greater unity among religious groups through increased cooperation 
 
 309. Id. 
 310. See supra Part III.B.2.c. 
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and improved understanding, could serve as a potent counterweight 
to popular religious intolerance by fostering goodwill and awareness 
among religious groups. 
Since 1973, ecumenism has experienced some notable accom-
plishments in Chile. In the early to mid-1970s, for example, various 
religious groups formed four separate institutions—CONAR, 
COPACHI, the Vicariate of Solidarity, and FASIC—that provided 
needed social services to victims of the Pinochet regime and their 
families.311 The cooperation involved in establishing these institu-
tions not only achieved an unprecedented level of ecumenical col-
laboration but also demonstrated the manner in which ideologically 
and doctrinally diverse religious groups could put aside their differ-
ences and work together for the common good. 
Similarly, since the early 1990s, different Protestant groups, in-
cluding the Evangelicals and Pentecostals, have increased their ecu-
menical involvement with one another. In early 1991, a body called 
the Committee of Evangelical Coordination began “meeting with 
some regularity.”312 This group included representatives from various 
Protestant and Pentecostal organizations, including the Christian 
Fraternity of Churches, the Council of Pastors, and other churches 
that remained politically neutral during the Pinochet period, such as 
the Baptists and Anglicans.313 Also, in 1995, the Third General As-
sembly of the Latin American Council of Churches (CLAI) met in 
Concepción, Chile, bringing together an unprecedented combina-
tion of historic Protestant and Pentecostal groups.314 
More recently, religious leaders from several Catholic, Protes-
tant, and Jewish institutions supported the creation of, and partici-
pated in, a “human rights round table” involving representatives 
from the Chilean military and various human rights organizations.315 
In addition, “a network of Catholic lay workers, priests and nuns as 
well as Protestant bishops and pastors” encouraged Chileans to vote 
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 315. Human Rights Dialogue Gets Underway: Shaky Start to Groundbreaking Initiative, 
CHIPS, Aug. 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10738992; see also Relatives of Disappeared De-
cline to Sit Down with Army Officers, EFE News Service, Aug. 8, 1999, available in WL 
8/8/99 EFE News Serv. 
THU-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:36 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1254 
in the 1999 presidential election and “distribut[ed] letters in their 
churches and communities calling on Christians to vote ‘in con-
science’ for the candidate who ‘best represents the values of a just 
society.’”316 Also, in March 2000, representatives of Chile’s Jewish, 
Muslim, and Christian communities held a three-day-long sympo-
sium on spiritual traditions relating to peace, seeking to “create in-
stances of reflection between the representatives” of the three 
groups.317 
Despite these successful ecumenical meetings and endeavors, 
however, ecumenism has yet to exert a significant or long-term influ-
ence on interdenominational relations in Chile. Consequently, ecu-
menism presently lacks the capacity to combat much of the interde-
nominational rivalry and popular prejudice that has fostered an 
atmosphere of de facto religious intolerance since the early 1990s. 
Three principal reasons explain ecumenism’s failure to make 
deeper inroads in Chile’s interdenominational arena. First, as illus-
trated by the dissolution of COPACHI in late 1975, because of 
ideological differences, 318 ecumenical endeavors depend on some 
degree of philosophical agreement, making them vulnerable to inter-
nal rifts as well as external pressures. Though the type of political po-
larization that doomed COPACHI no longer exists in Chile, differ-
ences of opinion as to social or political policy, or even the 
appropriateness of religious organizations’ participation in politics, 
have limited religious organizations’ ability to achieve the necessary 
consensus to engage in ecumenical collaboration. Thus, while 
“[e]cumenical groups exist [in Chile], . . . they often are formed on 
an ad hoc basis, depending on the issue involved.”319 
Second, to date, ecumenical efforts have involved only a rela-
tively small number of religious groups: Catholics, Jewish organiza-
tions, historic Protestants, and some, but not all, Pentecostals and 
Evangelicals. Literature addressing ecumenism fails to mention 
whether such groups as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Mormons, and 
other smaller minority religions have participated—or even been in-
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vited to participate—in ecumenical activities. To be fully effective in 
combating religious intolerance, ecumenism must incorporate as 
many religious groups as possible instead of focusing on several 
traditional or numerically superior groups. 
Third, and perhaps most seriously, the Catholic Church and Pen-
tecostal groups (the vast majority of Chilean Protestants) generally 
have been either unable or unwilling to form ecumenical relation-
ships. As two commentators observed, 
[a]n impasse in interchurch relations [between the Catholic Church 
and Pentecostal churches] exists at the institutional level, but a lar-
ger field exists that resembles the variety of human groupings in 
Santiago’s Parque Florestal in late afternoon. At one extreme are 
groups reaching out to others: the Centro Ecuménico Diego de 
Medellín, the Instituto Pedro de Córdoba, the smaller Pentecostal 
churches that joined the ecumenically minded World Council of 
Churches (the first Pentecostal groups anywhere to do so), the 
Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas, and the Na-
tional Catholic Commission on Ecumenism under Francisco Sam-
pedro Nieto. At the other extreme are the Pentecostal churches 
that do not cooperate even with other Protestant groups, much less 
with Catholics. In between, a great many Catholics and Pentecos-
tals pass one another by, without conflict, adjusting to differences 
in gait.320 
Recent studies have attributed the absence of ecumenism be-
tween Catholics and Pentecostals to Pentecostal unwillingness; 
though “many Catholic priests [are] well disposed to seek dialogue 
and cooperation with Pentecostals,” sixty-eight percent of Pentecos-
tals surveyed “rejected the idea of dialogue with Catholics.”321 
In light of Chile’s uneven and limited successes with ecumenism, 
it appears unlikely that, at least for the near future, ecumenical col-
laboration will be able to act as a widely effective countermeasure to 
the de facto intolerant effects of interdenominational rivalry and re-
lated popular religion-based prejudices. Ecumenism’s influence on 
the development of religious liberty could increase, however, to the 
extent that Chilean religious groups employ it on a regular basis, in-
 
 320. Cleary & Sepúlveda, supra note 170, at 113 (footnotes omitted). 
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volve a greater number of minority religions, and overcome the cur-
rent impasse separating the Catholic and Pentecostal churches. 
2. Problems with Protestants in politics 
Throughout the 1990s, many Protestant organizations and indi-
vidual Protestants have become increasingly active in socio-political 
activities. In addition to gaining recognition as a significant sector of 
the national electorate,322 for example, the Pentecostal community 
sponsored its first presidential candidate, pastor Salvador Pino, in the 
1999 election.323 Similarly, in 1994, Bishop Javier Vásquez Valencia, 
president of Chile’s Pentecostal Methodist church, accepted Chilean 
President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle’s invitation to form part of the 
National Commission for Overcoming Poverty and actively involved 
the Pentecostal community in the national fight against poverty.324 
Furthermore, the Committee of Evangelical Organizations an-
nounced its intention in 1998 to collect information, in complete 
confidentiality, about the fate of Chileans who “disappeared” by se-
curity forces and paramilitary groups under Pinochet.325 
Though necessary to promote and protect the interests of the 
Protestant community, the increased participation of Protestant or-
ganizations in politics and social issues possesses a strong potential to 
exacerbate existing intra- and interdenominational rivalries that have 
fomented religious intolerance in Chilean society. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following three scenarios. First, Pentecostal leaders have 
remained divided throughout the 1990s over the appropriateness of 
Pentecostal religious organizations’ involvement in political affairs. 
As seen above, Bishop Vásquez Valencia has actively promoted such 
 
 322. See Javier Vásquez Valencia, LA TERCERA, Mar. 1-7, 1997 (copy on file with au-
thor). 
 323. See Current Events Briefs, CHIPS, Aug. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10738979. 
Ten days after declaring his candidacy, however, Pino was “rejected by the Electoral Service” 
for failing “to present the 35,232 signatures required by law to register as an independent can-
didate.” Current News Briefs, CHIPS, Aug. 26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10739008. 
About 10 % of the more than 37,000 signatures secured by Pino “were invalid because they 
belonged to voters already registered in a political party.” Id. 
 324. See Carmen L. Ibarra, Los Evangélicos se Unen al Gobierno Contra la Pobreza, LA 
TERCERA, Mar. 21, 1994, at 9, available at DIALOG, Info-South File; Valencia, supra note 
322. 
 325. See F. de Ruyt & J. Ortega, Evangélicos Abrieron Templos para Recabar Datos Sobre 
Desaparecidos, LA TERCERA, Sept. 14, 1998 (visited May 19, 2000) <http://www.tercera.cl/ 
diario/09/14/2.html>. 
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involvement in several instances. On other occasions, however, 
Vásquez and other Pentecostal leaders have asserted that churches 
and clergy should stay out of politics.326 Such contradictory attitudes 
towards religious organizations’ and leaders’ participation in politics 
could cause intradenominational rifts between Pentecostal leaders 
and members, in addition to interdenominational conflict between 
Pentecostals and religious groups of the opposite opinion. 
Second, in the 1999 presidential election, Protestant leaders and 
religious organizations endorsed different candidates for varying re-
ligion-based reasons. “Leaders of the Pentecostal, Methodist, Baptist 
and other Protestant churches publicly endorsed [the coalition] can-
didate Ricardo Lagos,” stating that they did “not trust [the Conser-
vative] candidate Joaquin Lavin” because he belonged to the Catho-
lic congregation Opus Dei, “the most anti-Evangelical group known 
in the countries where it exists.”327 However, pastor and former 
presidential candidate Salvador Pino supported Lavin, arguing that 
Lavin “puts principles and values into play above all else.”328 This 
type of division of support for political candidates among Protestant 
leaders and groups for religiously based reasons could generate in-
tradenominational conflict between Protestant leaders and church 
members and different Protestant organizations. 
Third, and most important, Protestant political support for such 
morally divisive issues as divorce would place many Protestant or-
ganizations against the political agenda of the Catholic Church. No-
tably, Chile remains “the only country in the world where divorce is 
illegal.”329 A 1994 report stated that most Protestant churches in 
Chile favor the enactment of a divorce law.330 The Catholic Church, 
however, has strongly objected to such a law and actively worked to 
 
 326. See id.; Jorge Silva, Cuenta con 1.802.000 fieles: Iglesia Evangélica Creció Seis Por 
Ciento en 1993, LA TERCERA, Mar. 7, 1994, at 8, available in DIALOG, Info-South File; Two 
Dead, Eight Injured in Pinochet Coup Anniversary in Chile, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 
12, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File. 
 327. Current News Briefs, CHIPS, Jan. 7, 2000, available in 2000 WL 7221563. 
 328. Current News Briefs, CHIPS, Sept. 27, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10739099. 
 329. Till Death Do Us Part: Chile Debates Legalizing Divorce, CHIPS, Sept. 7, 1998, 
available in 1998 WL 8627532 [hereinafter Till Death Do Us Part]. Chile, however, allows 
the annulment of marriages on technical grounds, a practice that has been criticized for favor-
ing the rich who can afford the required annulment fee, promoting illegitimacy, and leaving 
women “without the right to property or child support.” FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 
174; see also Till Death Do Us Part, supra. 
 330. See Benigno Ramos, Evangélicos, a Favor de Una Ley Sobre Divorcio, LA TERCERA, 
May 12, 1994, at 9, available in DIALOG, Info-South File. 
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defeat efforts to pass a divorce law in the early and mid-1990s.331 In 
opposing the proposed law, Catholic officials “denied wanting to 
oppose Catholic doctrine on non-Catholics, and praised religious 
freedom as a positive good. But they added that they had an evan-
gelical mission to fulfill, and that it would be a mistake . . . to allow 
individual churches . . . to establish their own doctrines in these mat-
ters.”332 Protestant leaders’ and organizations’ support for a divorce 
law would thus plunge them in a battle with the Catholic Church, 
assuredly adding to the strained relations and interdenominational 
strife that presently exists between the two groups. 
In light of the above scenarios, it remains apparent that increased 
political involvement by Protestant organizations and leaders pre-
sents a difficult issue. Protestant organizations and leaders should be 
free to pursue those measures that, in their respective judgment, best 
further their community’s interests. However, such participation 
could create and exacerbate both intra- and interdenominational dis-
cord similar to that which has promoted religious intolerance 
throughout the past decade. This would be particularly true in the 
event that Protestant organizations challenged the Catholic Church’s 
opposition to such moral issues as divorce. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The development of religious liberty in Chile has followed a 
unique course between 1973 and 2000. In comparison with the pe-
riods 1925-1973 and 1990-2000, religious liberty between 1973 
and 1990, under the regime headed by General Pinochet, evolved in 
an abnormal manner. Rather than emerging in response to such tra-
ditional issues as classic liberalism and religious pluralism, freedom of 
religion under the Pinochet regime became almost exclusively a 
function of the military government’s authoritarian, anti-Marxist na-
tional security ideology, policies, and concerns. This extreme politi-
cization of religious liberty resulted in the establishment of de facto 
religious intolerance, as individual clergymen and religious organiza-
tions both suffered governmental and popular persecution in accor-
dance with their perceived political position. Simultaneously, Chile’s 
juridical regime succeeded in expanding its protection of religious 
liberty through both the enactment of national legislation and adop-
 
 331. See FLEET & SMITH, supra note 15, at 174-75. 
 332. Id. 
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tion of international treaties. These de jure measures regarding reli-
gious freedom also fell victim to the regime’s political focus, how-
ever, as the military government suspended many elements of the ju-
ridical system through the use emergency powers. Freedom of 
religion under the Pinochet dictatorship was thus characterized by 
contradictory developments that worked to simultaneously further 
and restrict its development. 
In the post-Pinochet period, the development of Chile’s juridical 
system has continued to extend de jure religious liberty guarantees 
and rights to new areas of the law, particularly through the recent 
enactment of the 1999 Law of Worship that established the legal 
equality of all religious organizations. These de jure gains, however, 
have been undermined as a matter of de facto reality by the govern-
ment’s continued practice of discriminating against minority reli-
gious groups and the evolution of increasingly antagonistic interde-
nominational rivalries. 
Compared against one another, the religious liberty-related de-
velopments that occurred in the Pinochet and post-Pinochet period 
reveal several important facts about the evolution and current status 
of religious freedom in Chile. First, as demonstrated by the previous 
discussions on governmental and popular perceptions and treatment 
of religious beliefs and groups, the national security policies and con-
cerns that heavily influenced the exercise of religious freedom under 
the Pinochet regime did not carry over to the post-Pinochet period. 
Government practices, however, have continued to promote de facto 
religious intolerance. Second, though the Pinochet regime added 
several notable provisions to Chile’s national juridical framework de-
fining the scope of religious freedom, the consolidation of democ-
racy in the post-Pinochet period has greatly strengthened the coun-
try’s commitment to protecting freedom of religion. In particular, 
the Law of Worship, which extended juridical protection of religious 
freedom to new areas of the law and society, potentially gives the 
Chilean state a greater capacity to legally ensure that all religions en-
joy the right to freely exercise their respective beliefs. 
The precise impact that the Law of Worship and nonjuridical fac-
tors such as interdenominational rivalry, ecumenism, and the in-
volvement of religious organizations in politics will have on the fu-
ture development of religious liberty in Chile currently remains 
unknown. What remains certain, however, is that religious liberty in 
Chile potentially stands at the threshold of a new era. Free of the de 
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facto limitations imposed upon it by the Pinochet regime, religious 
liberty could develop along numerous lines. For the present, how-
ever, religious liberty in Chile will apparently continue to follow the 
course it has traveled since 1973, undulating in the tension gener-
ated by competing de jure and de facto influences. 
Patrick J. Thurston∗ 
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Appendix 
THE 1999 LAW OF WORSHIP 
 
Original Spanish Text English Version  







Art. 1°. El Estado guarantiza la 
libertad religiosa y de culto en 
los términos de la Constitución 
Política de la Repúblic. 
Art. 1. The State guarantees 
the freedom of religion and 
worship under the terms of the 
Political Constitution of the 
Republic. 
 
Art. 2°. Ninguna persona 
podrá ser discriminada en 
virtud de sus creencias 
religiosas, ni tampoco prodrán 
éstas invocarse como motivo 
para suprimir, restringir o 
afectar la igualdad consagrada 
en la Constitución y la ley. 
Art. 2. No person can be 
subjected to discrimination 
due to his or her religious 
beliefs; neither can one’s 
religious beliefs be invoked as a 
reason to abolish, restrict, or 
affect the equality granted in 
the Constitution and the law. 
 
Art. 3°. El Estado guarantiza 
que las personsas desarrollen 
libremente sus actividades 
religiosas y la libertad de las 
iglesias, confesiones y entidades 
religiosas. 
Art. 3. The State guarantees 
that people may freely develop 
and exercise their religious 
activities; and the State 
guarantees the freedom of 
churches, confessions, and 
religious entities. 
 
Art. 4°. Para los efectos de esta 
ley, se entiende por iglesias, 
confesiones o instituciones 
religiosas a las entidades 
integradas por personas  
 
Art. 4. For the purposes of the 
present law, it is understood 
that the terms “churches,” 
“confessions” or “religious 
institutions” refer to  
 
THU-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:36 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1262 
naturales que profesen una 
determinada fe. 
entities composed of natural 
persons who profess a 
particular faith. 
 
Art. 5°. Cada vez que esta ley 
emplea el término “entidad 
religiosa”, se entenderá que se 
refiere a las iglesias, confesiones 
e instituciones religiosas de 
cualquier culto. 
Art. 5. Each time that this law 
uses the term “religious 
entity,” it will be understood 
to refer to the churches, 
confessions, and religious 
institutions of any faith. 
 
Capítulo II 
Libertad religiosa y de culto 
 
Chapter II 
Freedom of Religion and 
Worship 
 
Art. 6°. La libertad religiosa y 
de culto, con la 
correspondiente autonomía e 
inmunidad de coacción, 
significan para toda persona, a 
lo menos, las facultades de: 
 
(a) Profesar la creencia 
religiosa que libremente 
elija o no profesar ninguna; 
manifestarla libremente o 
abstenerse de hacerlo; o 





(b) Practicar en público o 
en privado, individual o 
colectivamente, actos de 
oración o de culto; 
conmemorar sus 
festividades; celebrar sus 
ritos; observar su día de 
descanso semanal; recibir a 
Art. 6. The freedom of 
religion and worship, with its 
corresponding autonomy and 
immunity from coercion, 
signifies for all people, at the 
least, the right to: 
 
(a) Profess the religious 
belief that they freely 
choose, or to profess no 
belief; to freely manifest 
such belief, or to abstain 
from doing so; or to 
change or abandon the 
religious belief that they 
used to profess; 
 
(b) Practice in public or 
private, individually or 
collectively, acts of prayer 
or of worship; 
commemorate their 
festivals; celebrate their 
rites; observe their weekly 
day of rest; receive a 
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su muerte una sepultura 
digna, sin discriminación 
por razones religiosas; no 
ser obligada a practicar 
actos de culto o a recibir 
asistencia religiosa contraria 
a sus convicciones 
personales y no ser 
pertubada en el ejercicio de 
estos derechos; 
 
(c) Recibir asistencia 
religiosa de su propia 
confesión donde quiera que 
se encuentre. La forma y 
condiciones del acceso de 
pastores, sacerdotes y 
ministros de culto, para 
ortogar asistencia religiosa 
en recintos hospitalarios, 
cárceles y lugares de 
detención y en los 
establecimientos de las 
Fuerzas Armadas y de las de 
Orden y Seguridad, serán 
reguladas mediante 
reglamentos que dictará el 
Presidente de la República, 
a través de los Ministros de 




(d) Recibir e impartir 
enseñanza o información 
religiosa por cualquier 
medio; elegir para sí—y los 
padres para sus menores no 
emancipados y los 
guardadores para los 
deserving burial, without 
discrimination for religious 
reasons; not be obligated 
to practice acts of worship 
or to receive religious 
assistance contrary to their 
personal convictions, and 
not be disturbed in 
exercising these rights; 
 
 
(c) Receive religious 
assistance from their own 
religion wherever they may 
be. The form and 
conditions of access of 
pastors, priests, and 
ministers of religion to 
provide religious assistance 
in hospitals, jails and places 
of detention, and the 
facilities of the Armed 
Forces and the forces of 
Order and Security will be 
regulated by regulations 
that the President of the 
Republic will issue through 
the Ministers of Health, 





(d) Receive and impart 
religious teachings or 
information by whatever 
means; to choose for 
themselves—and parents 
on behalf of their minor 
children, and guardians on 
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incapaces bajo su tuición y 
cuidado— la educación 
religiosa y moral que esté 
de acuerdo con sus propias 
convicciones, y 
 
(e) Reunirse o manifestarse 
públicamente con fines 
religiosos y asociarse para 
desarrollar 
comunitariamente sus 
actividades religiosas, de 
conformidad con el 
ordenamiento jurídico 
general y con esta ley. 
 
behalf of their wards—the 
moral and religious 
education that is in 
harmony with their own 
convictions; and 
 
(e) Meet or manifest 
themselves publicly for 
religious purposes and 
associate in order to carry 
out their religious activities 
as a community, in 
accordance with general 
legal norms and the 
present law. 
 
Art. 7°. En virtud de la libertad 
religiosa y de culto, se reconoce 
a las entidades religiosas plena 
autonomía para el desarrollo de 
sus fines propios y, entre otras, 
las siguientes facultades: 
 
 
(a) Ejercer libremente su 
propio ministerio, practicar 
el culto, celebrar reuniones 
de carácter religioso y 
fundar y mantener lugares 
para esos fines; 
 
 
(b) Establecer su propia 
organización interna y 
jerarquía; capacitar, 
nombrar, elegir y designar 
en cargos y jerarquías a las 
personas que correspondan 
y determinar sus 
denominaciones, y 
Art. 7. By virtue of the 
freedom of religion and 
worship, it is recognized that 
religious entities have full 
autonomy for the development 
of their own ends and, among 
others, the following rights: 
 
(a) To freely exercise their 
own ministry, practice acts 
of worship, celebrate 
meetings of religious 
nature, and found and 
maintain facilities for these 
ends; 
 
(b) To establish their own 
internal organization and 
hierarchy; to train, appoint, 
elect, and designate 
individuals to positions and 
hierarchies, and to 
determine their titles; and 
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(c) Enunciar, comunicar y 
difundir, de palabra, por 
escrito o por cualquier 
medio, su propio credo y 
manifestar su doctrina. 
(c) To declare, communicate, 
and express, by word, writing, 
or any other means, their own 









Juridical Personality and 
Bylaws 
Art. 8°. Las entidades 
religiosas podrán crear personas 
jurídicas de conformidad con la 
legislación vigente. En especial, 
podrán: 
 
(a) Fundar, mantener y 
dirigir en forma autónoma 
institutos de formación y de 
estudios teológicos o 
doctrinales, instituciones 
educacionales, de 
benefiencia o humanitarias, 
y 
 
(b) Crear, participar, 
patrocinar y fomentar 
asociaciones, corporaciones 
y fundaciones, para la 
realización de sus fines. 
 
Art. 8. Religious entities will 
be able to create juridical 
persons in conformity with 
prevailing legislation. In 
particular, they may: 
 
(a) Autonomously found, 
maintain, and direct 
institutes of formation and 
of theological or doctrinal 
studies, [and] educational, 




(b) Create, participate in, 
sponsor, and develop 
associations, corporations, 
and foundations for the 
realization of their 
objectives. 
 
Art. 9°. Las asociaciones, 
corporaciones, fundaciones y 
otros organismos creados por 
una iglesia, confesión o 
institución religiosa, que 
conforme a sus normas jurídicas 
propias gocen de personalidad 
jurídica religiosa, son 
Art. 9. Those associations, 
corporations, foundations, and 
other organizations created by 
a church, confession, or 
religious institution that, 
according to their own 
juridical norms, enjoy religious 
juridical personality, are 
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reconocidas como tales. 
Acreditará su existencia la 
autoridad religiosa que los haya 
erigido o instituido. Las 
entidades religiosas, así como 
las personas jurídicas que ellas 
constituyan en conformidad a 
esta ley, no podrán tener fines 
de lucro. 
recognized as such. The 
religious authority that created 
or instituted them will prove 
their existence. Religious 
organizations, like the juridical 
persons that they establish in 
conformity with this law, 
cannot be for profit. 
 
 
Art. 10°. Para constituir 
personas jurídicas que se 
organicen de conformidad con 
esta ley, las entidades religiosas 
deberán seguir el 
procedimiento que se indica a 
continuación: 
 
(a) Inscripción en el 
registro público que llevará 
el Ministerio de Justicia de 
la escritura pública en que 
consten el acta de 
constitución y sus estatutos; 
 
 
(b) Transcurso del plazo de 
noventa días desde la fecha 
de inscripción en el 
registro, sin que el 
Ministerio de Justicia 
hubiere formulado 
objeción; o, si habiéndose 
deducido objeción, ésta 
hubiera sido subsanada por 
la entidad religiosa o 
rechazada por la justicia, y 
 
(c) Publicación en el Diario 
Official de un extracto del 
Art. 10. To establish juridical 
persons that are organized in 
conformity with this law, 
religious entities should follow 




(a) Registration in the 
public registry, managed 
by the Ministry of Justice, 
of a notarized document in 
which are recorded the 
articles of incorporation 
and its bylaws; 
 
(b) Passage of ninety days 
since the date of 
registration in the public 
registry, without the 
Ministry of Justice having 
formulated an objection; 
or, if the there has been an 
objection, it has been 
repaired by the religious 
entity or rejected by the 
judiciary; and 
 
(c) Publication in the 
Diario Oficial of an extract 
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acta de constitución, que 
incluya el número de 
registro o inscripción 
asignado. 
 
Desde que quede firme la 
inscripción en el registro 
público, la respectiva entidad 
gozará de personalidad jurídica 
de derecho público por el solo 
ministerio de la ley. 
 
of the articles of 
incorporation that includes 
the assigned registry or 
registration number. 
 
Upon finalizing registration in 
the public registry, the 
respective entity will enjoy 
public law juridical personality 
for the ministry of the law. 
 
Art. 11°. El Ministerio de 
Justica no podrá denegar el 
registro. Sin embargo, dentro 
del plazo de noventa días 
contado desde la fecha de ese 
acto, mediante resolución 
fundada, podrá objetar la 
constitución si faltare algún 
requisito. La entidad religiosa 
afectada, dentro del plazo de 
sesenta días, contado desde la 
notificación de las objeciones, 
deberá subsanar los defectos de 
constitución o adecuar sus 
estatutos a las observaciones 
formuladas. De la resolución 
que objete la constitución 
podrán reclamar los interesados 
ante cualquiera de las Cortes de 
Apelaciones de la región en que 
la entidad religiosa tuviere su 
domicilio, seguiendo el 
procedimiento y plazos 
establecidos para el recurso de 
protección.  
Art. 11. The Ministry of 
Justice will not be able to deny 
registration. However, within 
the period of ninety days 
(counted from the date of 
registration), through a 
wellfounded decision, the 
Ministry will be able to object 
to the constitution if it 
breaches some requirement. 
The affected religious entity, 
with a period of sixty days of 
notification of the [Ministry’s] 
objections, should repair the 
defects to the constitution or 
make adequate its bylaws to 
the [Ministry’s] filed 
observations. Interested parties 
can appeal the [Ministry’s] 
decision objecting to the 
constitution before any Court 
of Appeals of the region in 
which the religious entity is 
domiciled, following the 
procedure and time period 
established for an appeal for 
protection. 
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Art. 12°. En los estatutos o 
normas propias de cada persona 
jurídica que se constituya en 
conformidad a las disposiciones 
de esta ley deberán contenerse 
aquellos elementos esenciales 
que la caracterizan y los 
órganos a través de los cuales 
actúa en el ámbito jurídico y 
que la representan frente a 
terceros. 
 
El acta constitutiva contendrá, 
como mínimo, la 
individualización de los 
constituyentes, el nombre de la 
persona jurídica, sus domicilios 
y la constancia de haberse 
aprobado los estatutos.  
 
Las personas condenadas por 
delito que merezca pena 
aflictiva no podrán suscribir el 
acta de constitución de la 
persona jurídica. 
Art. 12. The bylaws or own 
rules of each juridical person 
established in conformity with 
the requirements of this law 
should contain those essential 
elements that characterize the 
person, and the agencies [or 
organs] through which the 
person acts in the legal arena 
and that represents the person 
to third parties. 
 
The articles of incorporation 
will contain, at minimum, an 
individualized list of 
constituents, the name of the 
juridical person, its domiciles, 
and records of having 
approved the bylaws. 
 
Individuals convicted of a 
crime that merits afflictive 
punishment cannot sign the  
juridical person’s articles of 
incorporation. 
 
Art. 13°. Los ministros de 
culto de una iglesia, confesión 
o institución religiosa 
acreditarán su calidad de tales 
mediante certificación expedida 
por su entidad religiosa, a 
través de la respectiva persona 
jurídica, y les serán aplicables 
las normas de los artículos 360, 
N°. 1°.; 361, N°s. 1° y 3°, y 
362 del Código de 
Procedimiento Civil, así como 
lo establecido en el artículo  
 
Art. 13. Ministers of worship 
of a church, confession, or 
religious institution will prove 
their status as such by way of 
certification issued through the 
respective juridical person of 
their religious entity, and to 
them will apply, the norms 
found in 360(1), 361(1),(3), 
and 362 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, and article 201(2) 
of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 
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Patrimonio y exenciones 
 
Chapter IV 
Wealth and Exemptions 
Art. 14°. La adquisición, 
enajenación y administración de 
los bienes necesarios para las 
actividades de las personas 
jurídicas constituidas conforme 
a esta ley estarán sometidas a la 
legislación común. 
 
Sin perjucio de lo anterior, las 
normas jurídicas propias de 
cada una de ellas forman parte 
de los requisitos de validez para 
la adquisición, enajenación y 
administración de sus bienes. 
 
Art. 14. The acquisition, 
alienation, and administration 
of those assets necessary for the 
activities of juridical persons 
established in conformity with 
this law will be subject to 
general legislation. 
 
Without prejudice of the 
above, the legal rules of each 
juridical person form part of 
the enforceability requirements 
for the acquisition, alienation, 
and administration of its assets. 
Art. 15°. Las entidades 
religiosas podrán solicitar y 
recibir toda clase de donaciones 
y contribuciones voluntarias, de 
particulares e instituciones 
públicas o privadas y organizar 
colectas entre sus fieles, para el 
culto, la sustentación de sus 
ministros u otros fines propios 
de su misión. 
 
 
Ni aún en caso de disolución 
los bienes de las personas 
jurídicas religiosas podrán pasar 




Art. 15. Religious entities are 
able to solicit and receive all 
classes of donations and 
voluntary contributions from 
members of the public, and 
public and private institutions, 
and to organize collections 
from their members, for the 
religion, the support of their 
ministers, or other purposes of 
their mission. 
 
Not even in the case of 
dissolution will the assets of 
religious juridical persons be 
able to pass to the possession 
of any of its members. 
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Art. 16°. Las donaciones que 
reciban las personas jurídicas a 
que se refiere esta ley, estarán 
exentas del trámite de 
insinuación, cuando su valor no 
exceda de veinticinco unidades 
tributarias mensuales. 
 
Art. 16. The donations 
received by those juridical 
persons referred to by this law 
will be exempt from taxation 
when the donations’ value 
does not exceed monthly tax 
units. 
Art. 17°. Las personas jurídicas 
de entidades religiosas regidas 
por esta ley tendrán los mismos 
derechos, exenciones y 
beneficios tributarios que la 
Constitución Política de la 
República, las leyes y 
reglamentos vigentes otorguen 
y reconozcan a otras iglesias, 
confesiones e instituciones 
religiosas existentes en el país. 
 
 
Art. 17. The juridical persons 
of religious entities governed 
by this law will have the same 
rights, exemptions, and tax 
benefits that the Political 
Constitution of the Republic, 
the laws, and existing 
regulations grant and 
recognize to other churches, 
confessions, and religious 
institutions existing in the 
country. 
 
Art. 18°. Las personas jurídicas 
religiosas que a la época de su 
inscripción en el registro 
público, hubieran declarado ser 
propietarias de inmuebles u 
otros bienes subjetos a registro 
público, cuyo dominio aparezca 
a nombre de personas natuales 
o jurídicas distintas de ellas 
podrán, en el plazo de un año 
contado desde la constitución, 
regularizar la situación usando 
los procedimientos de la 
legislación común, hasta 
obtener la inscripción 




Art. 18. Those religious 
juridical persons that, at the 
time of their inscription in the 
public registry, have declared 
to be proprietors of real estate 
or other assets subject to 
public registry that are 
registered in the name of 
natural or juridical persons 
who are distinct from them 
will be able to, within one year 
of their establishment, 
regularize the situation using 
the procedures instituted by 
general legislation, until they 
have obtained the 
corresponding registration in 
their name. 
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Si optaren por la donación, 
estarán exentas del trámite de 
insinuación. 
If the religious juridical 
persons choose to donate such 
assets or property, they will be 







Art. 19°. La disolución de una 
persona jurídica constituida 
conforme a esta ley podrá 
llevarse a cabo de conformidad 
con sus estatutos, o en 
complimiento de una sentencia 
judicial firme, recaída en juicio 
incoado a requerimiento del 
Consejo de Defensa de Estado, 
el que podrá accionar de oficio 
o a petición de parte, en los 




Disuelta la persona jurídica, se 
procederá a eliminarla del 
registro a que se refiere el 
artículo 10°. 
Art. 19. The dissolution of a 
juridical person established in 
conformity with this law can 
occur in conformity with the 
juridical person’s bylaws, or in 
conjunction with a 
wellfounded judicial decision 
commenced by the 
requirement of the Council of 
Defense of the State, which 
can act on its own or at a 
party’s petition in those cases 
that correspond to the 
Council. 
 
Upon dissolution of the 
juridical person, it will be 
removed from the registry 





Art. 20°. El Estado reconoce el 
ordenamiento, la personalidad 
jurídica, sea ésta de derecho 
público o de derecho privado, y 
la plena capacidad de goce y 
ejercicio de las iglesias, 
confesiones e instituciones 
religiosas que los tengan a la 
fecha de publicación de esta ley, 
entidades que mantendrán el 
Art. 20. The State recognizes 
the law, the juridical 
personality (be it of public law 
or private law), and the full 
capacity of pleasure and 
exercise possessed by the 
churches, confessions, and 
religious institutions at the 
date of publication of this law; 
these entities will maintain the 
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régimen jurídico que les es 
propio, sin que ello sea causa 
de trato desigual entre dichas 
entidades y las que se 
constituyan en conformidad a 
esta ley. 
juridical regime that belongs to 
them, without having it being 
the cause of unequal treatment 
between such entities and 
those that are established in 
conformity with this law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
